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HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FRAUD BY
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS*
By PAMELA H. Bucv**

T

HE amount of money lost to health care fraud, waste and
abuse,' estimated to be $90 billion per year, 2 would more
than cover the cost of extending health care to all uninsured
Americans.3 Moreover, the loss to fraud, waste and abuse is not
just economic. Providers who see their patients as the "raw mate*Copyright © 1993. All rights reserved. Pamela H. Bucy.
** Frank Bainbridge Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of

Law; Assistant United States Attorney, E.D. Mo., Criminal Division 1980-87; Coordinator, Health Care Fraud Task Force, E.D. Mo. 1985-87. 1 am most grateful
to the following people for their helpful feedback on this Article: William S.
Brewbaker III, James D. Bryce, Richard G. Singer and Susan Lyons Randall.
1. Gordon Witkin et al., Health Care Fraud, US. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Feb.
24, 1993, at 34 [hereinafter Health Care Fraud]. Waste and abuse in health care is
the expenditure of health care dollars for no valid reason, whereas fraud is intentional waste and abuse, usually through deception and for personal gain.
GAO, HEALTH INSURANCE: VULNERABLE PAYERS LOSE BILLIONS TO FRAUD 1, 9

(1992) [hereinafter VULNERABLE PAYERS].
2. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOM-

MENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS 15 (June, 1993) [hereinafter PROPAc REPORT]. In
1992, the United States spent 13.6% of the GNP, or $832 billion, on health care.
Id. This amount is expected to increase to $912 billion in 1993. Id. Experts
regularly estimate that fraud, waste and abuse account for 10% of America's
total health care expenditures. See VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 1, at 8. In
comparison to the $80-90 billion lost per year to health care fraud, waste and
abuse, an estimated $5 billion will have been lost during the entire savings and
loan debacle. Health Care Fraud, supra note 1, at 34. As Dr. Philip Caper, an
internist and medical policy analyst at Dartmouth Medical School noted: "I
can't imagine a system that's more dysfunctional than the one we have nowmore expensive, not doing the job, with more waste." Wasted Health Care Dollars,
57 CONSUMER REPORTS 435 (1992).

3. Steven Pearlstein, A Hard Pill to Swallow, THE WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.,
May 17-23, 1993, at 6. The estimated cost of extending health insurance coverage to the uninsured ranges from $45-$100 billion. Id. Currently, there are 37
million uninsured Americans. Id. Eighty-five percent of these individuals are
employed (62% full time; 23.2% part time) but receive no health insurance coverage. Tamar Lewin, High Medical Costs Hurt Growing Numbers in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1991, at Al, A14. "For small business, insurance has become unaffordable; three of four concerns employing 10 or fewer people simply don't provide
health benefits." Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 436. The uninsured,
when they receive health care, receive less:
A group from the University of California, San Francisco, for example,
looked at the hospital care given to sick newborn babies in the state's
hospitals in 1987. Even though the uninsured babies were, on the average, the sickest group, they left the hospital sooner than insured babies
and received fewer services while they were there.
Id. at 447.

(1003)
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rial for profits" 4 too often deliver inadequate, incompetent or unnecessary health care. 5
The bad news continues. More than any other type of white
collar crime, 6 fraud by health care providers is hard to detect, in4. Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health and Long
Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging: Part 5, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 544
(1976) (statement of Patricia G. Oriol, Chief Clerk, Senate Comm. on Aging)
[hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Part 5]. Ms. Oriol participated in an
eight month investigation of Medicaid abuse sponsored by the United States
Senate. Id. at 539. Ms. Oriol posed as a Medicaid recipient and visited numerous health care facilities around the country. Id.
5. For a discussion of health care fraud by providing unnecessary or substandard health care services, see generally Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud By Fright:
White Collar Crime By Health Care Providers,67 N.C. L. REV. 855 (1989) [hereinafter
Fraud by Fright]. "With so many incentives to overtreat patients, it seems inevitable that a sizeable fraction of American medical care must be simply unnecessary, if not downright harmful." Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 439.
A recent Rand study found that 32% of elderly patients who received an operation to remove atherosclerotic plaque from the carotid artery did not need it and
that 14% of heart bypass operations were unnecessary. Id. Another study, by
Value Health Sciences, found that 27% of hysterectomies, 17% of surgeries for
carpal tunnel syndrome, 16% of tonsillectomies and 14% of laminectomies were
unnecessary. Id.
One dramatic example showed the regional variation in the frequency of
procedures. Id. In the 1960s in Stowe, Vermont, the probability of having a
tonsillectomy by age 15 was about 70%. In Waterbury, Vermont, which is over
the hill from Stowe, the probability was 10%. Id. at 441.
Investigations by congressional committees in the 1970s and 1980s may
have produced the most alarming examples of poor health care rendered when
providers practice more fraud than medicine. See, e.g., Medicare and Medicaid
Frauds: Part 5, supra note 4, at 521-65; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care and the Subcomm. on Health of the Elderly of the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Part 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-69 (1975) [herinafter Medicare and MedicaidFrauds, Part 1]. In Chicago, entire families of five or
six children were given mass tonsillectomies with janitors left to monitor postoperative recovery. Healthy United States Senators and staffers traveling undercover to Medicaid clinics, as well as many patients they interviewed, were given
false diagnoses of allergies, hypertension and glaucoma. Medicare and Medicaid
Frauds: Part 5, supra note 4, at 521-65; Medicare and Medicaid Frauds, Part 1, supra,
at 68-69.
In another instance, in massive "rolling labs" fraud, where patients were
given false diagnoses to further the fraud, patients also suffered. GAO, ONE
SCHEME ILLUSTRATES VULNERABILITIES TO FRAUD 1 (1992) [hereinafter ONE
SCHEME ILLUSTRATES VULNERABILITIES TO FRAUD]. For example, one healthy
athlete "was astounded when he learned months after his tests [showing false
illnesses] that a life-insurance application had been rejected." Health Care Fraud,
supra note 1, at 36. This patient explained: " 'All of a sudden, this glaring thing
comes up on my record stating that I have all these diseases, including heart
defects and obstructive pulmonary emphysema. According to their diagnosis, I
was ready to die.' " Id.

6. Like other white collar crimes, health care fraud blurs the distinction between civil and criminal law. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 871-75; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal'? Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) (Professor
Coffee discusses the "dominant development in substantive criminal law over
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vestigate and prove. 7 The difficulties extend from top to bottom:
the hundreds of thousands of different reimbursement fee schedules generated by a multi-payer system; the fact that a third party
to the services rendered is paying the bill; the fee for service reimbursement mechanism that encourages inflation of charges.
These difficulties need not exist to the extent they do. Considerable attention has been given to health care fraud lately, and hopefully, some of the recommendations made by law enforcement
experts in this area will be implemented. 8 Beefing up law enforcement techniques and tools, however, is only part of the answer to health care fraud. It also is necessary to examine and
restructure the systemic incentives for fraud in various reimbursement mechanisms. 9 The most conscientious and skilled law enforcement efforts can never overcome the incentives in our
current health care system for providers to inflate, create and lie.
As the United States moves toward health care reform, there
the last decade," which he describes as "the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law."). Public prosecutors pursue such
crimes through criminal statutes while private litigants pursue these same crimes
through "private attorney general" statutes such as RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et
seq., and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. Thus, this Article assumes that the plaintiff pursuing health care fraud may be a public servant such
as a prosecutor or a private citizen.
7. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 875-81. Several factors contribute to the
difficulty in detecting and proving health care fraud including: the relationship
of trust between doctor and patient, the subjective nature of medicine in both
diagnosis and treatment, and the excessive amount of documentation involved
in the billing process. Id.
8. Such recommendations include: stricter requirements for obtaining provider numbers, ONE SCHEME ILLUSTRATES VULNERABILITIES To FRAUD, supra note
5, at 2; standardization of claim forms, VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 1, at 5;
utilization thresholds on doctor's visits, prescriptions, lab tests, and DME supplies where prior insurer authorization is needed to exceed these thresholds,
Health Care Fraud and Waste (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 131
(1991) [hereinafter Health Care Fraudand Waste]; a process to confirm that patient
services have been provided, id.; strict insurer approval for "big ticket" items
such as prescribed footwear, medical equipment, etc., id.; and, a requirement
that high volume providers post a performance bond to minimize and discourage the financial loss from "hit and run" fraudulent providers, id.
9. For sources discussing the link between fraud by health care providers
and reimbursement mechanisms, see, e.g., VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 1, at 1,
13; Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 933-37 (asserting that third party fee for
service reimbursement mechanisms encourage fraud); cf. Henry Pontell et al.,
PractitionerFraud and Abuse in Medical Benefit Programs, 6 LAW & POL'Y 405, 418-20
(1984) [hereinafter PractitionerFraud and Abuse] (discussing how fee for service
reimbursement influences some types of fraud); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 422 (1982) (discussing correlation between
health care reimbursement mechanism and demand for physicians); DIANE
VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 54-104 (1983)
(discussing social and structural incentives for unlawful behavior).
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is a unique opportunity to benefit from the relationship between
fraud by providers and health care reimbursement systems. To
benefit from this link, we must restructure health care delivery
and reimbursement systems in ways that discourage fraud and
make it easier to detect and prove.
On September 22, 1993 President Clinton officially unveiled
his health care reform package. It contains the following elements: a standard package of benefits available to all Americans
and legally resident aliens;' 0 the organization of consumers into
regional or corporate health alliances that collect premiums, negotiate with providers for consumers, and collect and distribute
information about the providers;" an annual enrollment during
which consumers decide whether to remain with their current
2
provider-group or enroll with another group.'
President Clinton is not the only policy maker proposing
health care reform. In recent years numerous proposals for
health care reform have been introduced in Congress.' 3 Currently, there are proposals that emphasize managed competition
4
(competition among providers within prescribed guidelines),'
utilize a single payer mechanism,' 5 and employ a voucher system
to achieve coverage of more persons.' 6 Unfortunately, all of
these proposals-to the extent they address fraud and abusefocus on law enforcement solutions.' 7 None of these proposals
10. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1101-1128 (1993) (the
"Clinton" Plan).
11. Id. §§ 1300-1330.
12. Id.§§ 1322-1323.
13. For an excellent summary of recent legislative initiatives, see Theodore
Marmon and Michael Barr, Alaking Sense of the National Health Insurance Reform
Debate, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 228 (1992). There have been over 40 different
national health care proposals presented to Congress. Id. at 228 n.6. These
proposals illustrate numerous approaches to health care reform: tax credit
plans, malpractice reform, state insurance plans, single payer plans, and employer based plans. Id. at 270-71.
14. H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1993) (the "Cooper" Plan).
15. H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993) (the "McDermott" or "Single Payer" Plan).
16. S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan).
Under the Senate Republican bill, federal vouchers for health insurance
would be made available to individuals with incomes below a specified percentage of the poverty level. Id. §§ 1003-1004.
Although it is difficult to assess the fraud potential in a voucher system without more details, the food stamp program provides a possible example: rampant fraud could exist in a black market for health care vouchers. One way to
help deter this would be by coding the voucher with sufficient information about
an individual's physical characteristics and health that makes selling vouchers
impossible.
17. Although they focus on law enforcement techniques to address fraud,
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examine the causal relationship between reimbursement mechanisms and fraud and abuse.
This Article analyzes these health care reform options from a
fraud and abuse perspective, suggesting how some will encourage
fraud by providers, while others will discourage fraud. Purely
from an anti-fraud perspective, this Article suggests that the optimal health care system contains the following four features: (1)
capitation reimbursement (reimbursing a provider a set amount
for all services rendered to a person in a given period of time,
usually one year); 18 (2) managed competition; (3) required copayments by all patients who are financially able; and, (4) standardized billing and payment procedures. Although this system would
be superior to our current system, some fraud would still exist.
Thus, this Article notes the ways in which this suggested reformed health care system remains vulnerable to fraud and details
anti-fraud steps that can be implemented regardless of which reform plan is passed.
Part I of this Article analyzes the impact of fraud by health
care providers in the fee for service reimbursement mechanism
waste and abuse, some of the proposals include overall changes in the health
care system that will help deter and detect fraud and abuse. A number of the
current proposals, for example, include provisions for assigning unique provider identifiers, a step that can help track recidivist providers who elude law
enforcement by changing their provider number. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, S. 1757,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5104 (1993) (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 1200, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 414 (1993) (the "McDermott" Plan); H.R. 3222, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 6004 (1993) (the "Cooper" Plan); S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3307 (1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan).
18. With capitation reimbursement, medical care would be managed to "include such practices as restricting patients to a single primary-care doctor who
must approve all specialist referrals; penalizing doctors who order too many
tests or procedures; and, pre-approving elective hospitalization." Wasted Health
Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 435; see also PAUL STARR, LOGIC OF REFORM 40-42
(1992).
This definition differs slightly from Starr's definition of managed care as
embracing "any health plan that limits the choice of providers or regulates their
treatment decisions to eliminate inappropriate care and reduce costs." STARR,
supra, at 40. Starr noted that the original concept of managed care has been
expanded with the inclusion of a variety of provider groups, some relying on
traditional (fee for service) payment arrangements. Id., Thus, Starr concluded,
"it is not possible to generalize about the overall record of managed care." Id.
It is beyond the intention of this Article to discuss the normative issues inherent in health reform options other than as necessary to discuss their impact
on fraud by providers. For excellent sources on the various reforms historically
and currently considered in the United States and on health care systems in
other countries, see generally id. at 16; Symposium, America's Health Care: Which
Road to Reform 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 228 (1992); HEALTH AFF. 7passim (Supp.
1993). For an analysis of the economic consequences of various health care reforms, see generally America's Health Care. Which Road to Reform, supra, at 10;
Pearlstein, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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that has dominated the twentieth century American health care
system. Part II describes the components of the optimal antifraud system, while Part III evaluates its vulnerabilities to fraud.
Part IV focuses on the potential for fraud in various options for
collecting the funds needed to pay for health care. Part V concludes by suggesting how best to employ law enforcement resources to detect and prove the types of fraud that will exist in
whatever type of health reform that is implemented.
Prior to this analysis, three caveats must be noted. First,
whatever impact on fraud that exists in any reform model exists
only to the extent that the model is implemented. If health care
reform is implemented piecemeal, current incentives for fraud
will continue, at least in part, and the efficacy of any disincentives
to commit fraud contained in reform efforts will be diminished.
Second, the full impact of fraud on any reform effort cannot be
analyzed fully until all details of reform proposals are available.
For example, considerable fraud is inherent in the organization
and duties of the regional health purchasing alliances proposed
by the Clinton Administration and others.' 9 However, because
the details of how these alliances will work remain sketchy, 20 it is
not possible to assess fully the types of fraud that will occur because of this new structure or what detection, investigation and
deterrence techniques will be needed to combat such fraud.
Third, the emphasis herein on fraudulent health care providers
should not obscure the fact that most health care providers are
honest professionals who make good faith efforts to treat their
patients competently and to comply with complex and rapidly
changing billing regulations. It is this professionalism that makes
some of the suggestions contained herein viable.
I.

A.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Fraud Analysis of the Feefor Service Reimbursement Mechanism

Fee for service reimbursement has dominated most of American twentieth century medicine. 2 1 From an anti-fraud perspec19. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, §§ 1301-1397. Policy analysts recommending and
discussing health alliances include Paul Starr, Walter A. Zelman, Alain C. Enthoven, James C. Robinson, all of whom have recently discussed health alliances
in HEALTH AFF. 7 (Supp. 1993). The "Cooper" and the "Senate Republican"
Plans establish structures in which "purchasing cooperatives" perform similar
functions. H.R. 3222 §§ 1101-1108; S. 1770 § 1404.
20. Robert Pear, States are Reluctant Partnersin Clinton's Big New Venture, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at Al, A12.
21. The "Clinton" Plan and the "McDermott" Plan preserve fee for service
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tive, it is a disaster. Fee for service, which pays per service
rendered, encourages overutilization. 2 2 Under this system, "the
more doctors do, the more they get paid." 23 To the fraudulent
provider, fee for service reimbursement encourages the following
types of fraud: (1) billing for services not provided; (2) billing for
a more expensive service than what was actually provided; (3)
providing and billing for unnecessary services while representing
that the services were necessary; and, (4) paying kickbacks for re24
ferrals, including self-referrals.
Reported cases exemplify each of these types of fraud. 25 The
first two types of fraud, billing for services not rendered and misrepresenting the type of service actually rendered, are easiest for
the fraudulent provider to accomplish when the services occur in
high volume when legitimately performed, are difficult to verify
by subsequent physical exam, and are administered to patients
incapable of accurately recalling their treatment. 26 Examples of
services typically billed for when they did not occur include docreimbursement as an optional method of paying providers. H.R. 3600, S. 1757,
§ 1322 (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 612 (1992) (the
"McDermott" Plan). None of the remaining plans: the Cooper; the House Republican; nor the Senate Republican, discuss reimbursement methods.
22. PractitionerFraud and Abuse, supra note 9, at 418. James C. Robinson, a
health care economist at the University of California, Berkeley, offered the following analogy in explaining how our fee for service insurance system feeds our
health care appetite: "Imagine if we sold auto-purchase insurance and said, go
and buy whatever car you want and we'll pay 80 percent of it. Under those conditions, a lot of people would go buy a Mercedes." Wasted Health Care Dollars,
supra note 2, at 435.
23. Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 438 (quoting Dr. Philip Caper,
M.D., health care policy analyst at Dartmouth Medical School).
24. See generally Fraudby Fright,supra note 5, at 933. For a further discussion
of the types of fraud encouraged by a fee for service reimbursement plan, see
infra notes 25-46 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of several cases that exemplify the fraud prevalent in a
fee for service reimbursement plan, see infra notes 27-29, 31-40 & 43-45 and
accompanying text.
26. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 893-99. To successfully prove fraud by
billing for services not rendered, it is critical that the prosecution call expert
witnesses to testify that based on their physical examination of the patient, the
services in question were not rendered. Cf United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d
743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977) (affirming conviction of physician based on expert witness' testimony that he had examined the patient and, in his opinion, the services billed for were not performed); United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772, 77677 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing conviction of physician because government expert witness based testimony on lack of documentation in file rather than physical examination of patient).
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disbursements of medicines, 28 and simple procex-rays. 29
as
dures such
Misrepresentations regarding services actually rendered fall
into two types, each type highlighting a different aspect of the fee
for service reimbursement mechanism. 30 One type of misrepresentation reflects the fact that insurers pay fees for some, but not
all, services. In this type of fraud, the services actually performed
by the provider were not compensable under pertinent payment
guidelines yet the fraudulent provider misrepresents the service
as compensable. Examples include: a podiatrist who represented
that his patients were treated for complex and compensable
podiatric ailments when in fact he performed simpler procedures,
such as trimming toenails; 3 ' an optometrist who sold noncompensable sunglasses to patients but claimed he had supplied compensable cataract eye-glasses; 32 a physician who represented that
he provided compensable injections for joint pain but actually
supplied noncompensable injections of routine vitamins or
medicines;3 3 a shoe store proprietor who claimed to have suptors

Visits,

27

27. See, e.g., United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 579 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 295 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018
(1983).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1031 (1980).
29. People v. American Medical Ctrs., 324 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Mich. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983). The procedure at issue in this case was anything but simple. Here, the defendant-physicians were convicted for billing
Medicaid for "direct laryngoscopies" that had never been performed. Id. at 787.
A direct laryngoscopy is an examination of the exterior and the interior of the
larynx using an instrument that is inserted down a patient's throat. TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 931 (15th ed. 1985). The patients testified
that they did not undergo this procedure. American Medical Ctrs., 324 N.W.2d at
791.
30. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 896-99.
31. United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 1976). In Rousseau, the podiatrist submitted medical forms for each of twenty elderly rest home
patients falsely representing that he had treated the patients for fungus infections and ingrown toenails. Id.
32. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 808-09 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985). In Gold, the defendant developed a sales strategy,
known as "double cataract sales." Id. Under this strategy, sales persons urged
customers requesting regular cataract glasses to purchase cataract sunglasses as
well. Id. The sunglasses, however, were noncompensable under Medicare
guidelines, because Medicare beneficiaries were entitled to only one pair of eyeglasses per year, and then only if prescribed by a doctor. Id. Nevertheless, the
defendant routinely submitted Medicare reimbursement forms for the cataract
sunglasses, representing them as compensable glasses. Id.
33. United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Mekjian, the defendant was indicted for 60 counts of fraud and was convicted on
16 counts. Id. In addition to being convicted for misrepresenting ordinary vita-
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plied compensable orthopedic shoes when in fact he supplied ordinary, noncompensable street shoes; 34 a podiatrist who
represented that he treated patients during an office visit, but
only spoke to them over the telephone; 35 and, a physician who
billed Medicare for allergy shots he allegedly administered but
which actually were administered by a nurse. 36
The second type of misrepresentation regarding services actually provided reflects the fact that insurers compensate more
for some services than for others. Providers committing this type
of fraud actually performed a compensable service but claim they
performed another, more highly compensable, service. Examples
include: a medical laboratory that billed for "manual" blood tests
when "automated" blood tests were performed; 37 a physician
min injections as compensable medical treatment, the defendant was also convicted of fraudulently billing for noncompensable laboratory work. Id.
In United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1157 (1974), the defendant represented that he had performed aspirations of hematomas or arthrocentesis. Id. The former treatment involves draining fluid from the hip or shoulderjoint. Id. The latter treatment is the injection
of steroids directly into thejoint. Id. Twelve of the defendant's former patients
testified that they received only common injections and not aspirations of hematomas or arthrocentesis. Id.
34. State v. Quinn, 719 P.2d .936, 938 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 105
Wash.2d 1020 (1986); United States v. Yosevitch, No. 83-1896 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12,
1983), aff'd., 745 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Yosevitch Indictment on file with
author).
35. Commonwealth v. Stein, 526 A.2d 411, 413 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 546 A.2d 36 (1988). In Stein, the defendant billed Medicaid for office
visits when, in fact, he had only renewed a prescription over the phone for orthopedic shoes. Id. In addition, the record indicated that the defendant had
billed Medicaid for 33 separate office visits for the children of three patients. Id.
36. United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1078 (1988). Defendant Dr. Larm was indicted on 98 counts of Medicaid fraud. Id. at 782. The first 84 counts charged that Dr. Larm had billed
Medicaid for 84 office visits. Id. "Office visits" are billed under code number
90040 and are "[b]rief examination[s], evaluation[s], and/or treatment[s] [of
the] same or new illness." Id. In each case in which Dr. Larm billed for an office
visit, he never actually saw the patient. Id. Rather, the patient received a routine
allergy shot that was administered by a nurse. Id. On appeal from his conviction, Dr. Larm argued that the patients had actually visited his office and that the
treatment they received was within the description of an office visit. Id. The
court rejected Dr. Larm's argument because billing code 90030, "minimal service," more precisely described the service actually rendered to the patients. Id.
at 783. "Minimal services" is defined as, "injections, minimal dressings, etc.,
not necessarily requiring the presence of a physician." Id. Dr. Larm also was
convicted on 10 additional counts of fraud for billing Medicaid for the administration of allergy injections that the patients administered to themselves. Id. at
782.
37. United States v. Precision Medical Lab., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir.
1978). The owners of a medical testing laboratory were convicted on 77 counts
of submitting false claims for laboratory services to Medicare and Medicaid. Id.
at 436. There are two types of equipment that can be used to analyze blood-an
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who billed for single-patient visits when the visits were with multiple patients;3 8 a psychiatrist who misrepresented the length of
psychiatric evaluations;3 9 and, a nursing home that misrepre40
sented the level of care given to patients.
Billing for unnecessary services, the third type of fraud encouraged by the fee for service payment system, is not, by itself, a
fraud. It becomes fraud when a bill is accompanied by the false
representation that a service was necessary. Because the fee for
service system rewards for volume of services rendered, there is
strong incentive for the fraudulent provider to perform and bill
for unnecessary services. Although difficult to prove as fraud, as
opposed to simple malpractice, this type of fraud gives plaintiffs a
major advantage by clearly identifying the patient who suffered
the unnecessary medical procedures as a victim of the provider's
malfeasance. Most health care fraud prosecutions identify an insurance company or the government as the victim of the fraud
because it lost, or could have lost, money due to the defendant's
dishonesty. Insurance companies and governmental agencies,
however, are not sympathetic victims in the eyes of most people.
By contrast, patients who have received inadequate, incompetent,
or unnecessary medical services are genuinely sympathetic vic"Auto Analyzer II," which is manual, and a "SMAC," which is automated. Id. at
437-38. In this case, the owners submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid for
blood tests done on the manual equipment. Id. at 438. Actually, the tests were
done on automated equipment. Id. Medicare and Medicaid pay higher rates for
tests done using the manual equipment. Id.
38. People v. Lee, 351 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1984). The defendant
treated several members of the same family on the same day during the course
of a home visit. Id. The defendant billed Medicaid for a full reimbursement for
each family member. Id. The Medicaid program provides full reimbursement
for only one patient per home visit. Id. Each additional patient treated during
the course of the same home visit entitles the doctor to only partial reimbursement. Id.
39. State v. Dean, 314 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981). The defendant conducted psychiatric evaluations for a number of Medicaid recipients. Id.
Although the defendant spent less than one hour with each patient, she billed
Medicaid for two hour evaluation sessions. Id.
40. United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1070 (1983). In Huckaby, the defendant owned and managed a nursing home facility in Little Rock, Arkansas. Id. The defendant was indicted for
Medicaid fraud. Id. Specifically, the defendant misrepresented the level of care
needed by the patients in her nursing home. Id. The Arkansas Medicaid program reimburses long-term care providers according to the level of care each
patient needs. Id. The more care a patient needs, the more Medicaid reimburses the long-term care provider. Id. Each long-term care provider must
complete a form indicating the level of each patient's medical care needs. Id.
The defendant misrepresented the level of care needed by all of the patients at
her nursing home to receive greater reimbursements from Medicaid. Id.
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4
tims and tend to make a plaintiff's case much stronger. '
The incentive for the last type of fraud encouraged by fee for
service reimbursement, paying kickbacks for referrals, also derives directly from the emphasis on volume in fee for service reimbursement. Kickbacks are one way for the unscrupulous
provider to increase volume. In a fee for service system, the kickbacks routinely flow from one provider to another and are easily
concealed in legitimate payments simultaneously flowing between
the providers. 4 2 Reported cases exemplify these types of kickbacks: fees paid by medical laboratories to physicians to induce
referrals of patient specimens; 4 3 payments by durable medical
equipment companies to hospital or nursing home personnel by
durable medical equipment companies to induce the purchase of
equipment and supplies; 44 and, payments to city officials to in45
duce referral of ambulance business.

41. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 920-32.
42. Id. at 914-20.
43. United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985). The defendant was president of Mobile Medical Industries (MMI), a medical management service for Mobile Medical Group (MMG). Id. MMG provided medical
care primarily to Medicare recipients. Id. The defendant entered into an agreement with a medical laboratory in which the defendant would refer Medicare
business to the laboratory in exchange for a 20% kickback of the revenues generated from such business. Id.; see also United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp.
1560, 1561 (D. Mass. 1986). In Sadlier, the defendant was Chief Respiratory
Therapist at a large hospital in Rhode Island. Id. The defendant's primary job
was managing the Respiratory Therapy Department. Id. The defendant made
purchases of therapy supplies from a particular supplier in exchange for kickbacks and bribes. Id.
44. United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1084 (1981). In Peristein, the defendant was convicted of receiving kickback payments in connection with the furnishing of Medicaid services. Id. at
661-62. The defendant was the administrator of two nursing homes whose residents predominantly receive Medicaid. Id. at 662. The defendant solicited certain pharmacies and physical therapists to provide services for the nursing home
in exchange for cash payments based on a percentage of the reimbursements
from Medicaid. Id. Subsequent to the plan's failure, the defendant instead received $416 per month in alcoholic beverages in exchange for the referrals. Id.;
see also United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1034 (1980). In Tapert, five osteopathic physicians were convicted of receiving
kickbacks in return for sending their urine and blood samples to a certain laboratory. Id. at 113. Medicare and Medicaid paid for all charges for the laboratory
work. Id.
45. United States v. Bay Ambulance and Hospital Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20, 23-26 (1st Cir. 1989). Defendant Bay State Ambulance and Hospital
Rental Service, Inc. made several payments to a hospital official at the Quincy
City Hospital in exchange for the officials efforts to assure that Bay State would
win the bid for providing ambulance service to the hospital. Id. at 25. The hospital official received remunerations totaling over $15,000 over the course of a
17 month period. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 3

1014

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 1003

Kickbacks also may be in the form of self-referrals, for example, where an internist owns the laboratory to which she refers
specimens of her patients. Considerable attention has focused on
this problem recently, with the promulgation of regulations that
46
provide a "safe harbor" to some self-referral arrangements.
Unfortunately, each of the four types of fraud that flourish in
the fee for service system are easy to commit and difficult to detect. Billing for services not rendered and misrepresenting the
nature of services actually provided are the easiest of the frauds to
commit and the most difficult to detect because the actual rendering of services takes place in the privacy of the provider-patient
relationship. When these services legitimately occur in large volume, leave no physical manifestations when actually performed,
and are performed on patients unable to recall the rendering of
services, they become almost impossible to detect or prove. Providing and billing for unnecessary services is difficult to prove because of the subjective nature of medicine. What one provider
deems to be unnecessary, another believes to be essential. Proof
of intentional fraud becomes difficult in all but the most egregious cases. Kickbacks for referrals are difficult to detect because
they occur between a small number of close knit professionals
and are easily laundered in legitimate payments.
By themselves, price controls in the form of caps on fees 4 7 do
nothing to discourage any of these types of fraud because the
fraudulent provider is still financially rewarded for increasing volume. The only way to discourage the volume-enhancing types of
fraud that flourish in a fee for service system is to decrease the fee
amount when a certain volume-either in terms of the amount of
services rendered or in income earned by a provider-is
reached. 48 The deficiency in such steps is that they do not dis46. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (1992) (permitting physicians to refer business
to service organizations in which they have financial interest provided that investment relationship between physician and service provider meets certain enumerated standards). *
47. The "Clinton" Plan and the "McDermott" Plan require negotiated caps
on fees. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322 (1993) (the "Clinton"
Plan); H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 612 (1993) (the "McDermott" Plan).
48. Incentives to decrease volume exist in parts of Canada. See Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Now PatientsAre Paying Amid Canadian Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1993, at Al, AIO. For instance, in Ontario, physicians whose total billings reflect more than 20% house calls receive only $41.50 per house call exceeding
20% instead of the $71 per house call that the physician would otherwise receive. Id. In addition, fees drop for physicians earning more than $400,000 per
year (five percent of Ontario's physicians). Id. President Clinton's proposal to
cap insurance premiums paid is another potential volume decreaser. The Clinton
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courage fraud until the crucial volume is reached. The root problem is fee for service reimbursement and no amount of tinkering
will reduce its incentives to inflate fraudulefitly the volume of
services rendered.
B.

The Hazards of Piecemeal Health Care Reform

Another lesson we should learn about fraud from our past
experience with health care reform is that implementing health
care reform piecemeal leads to unanticipated, costly, and difficultto-control types of frauds. Prospective payment, introduced in
the mid-1980s and designed to contain costs, is one of the more
dramatic reforms in health care reimbursement attempted thus
far. Diagnosis related groups (DRGs) are the major prospective
payment effort. Under DRG reimbursement, illnesses are assigned to groups based upon the "estimated relative cost of hospital resources used with respect to discharges classified within
each group." 49 DRGs went into effect in 1983 and apply only to
in-patient hospital reimbursement for Medicare patients. 50 After
their implementation, hospitals treating Medicare patients receive
a set amount of money from the Medicare program for the treatment of each Medicare patient. If a hospital treats the patient for
less than it receives for that patient, it makes money. If it costs
the hospital more than the designated amount to treat the patient, the hospital loses money.
Whatever their success in controlling costs, 5' DRGs have encouraged new types of fraud: cost shifting; false reporting of
costs; new types of kickbacks; false diagnoses of patients; and,
growth of new health care businesses that have evolved too rapHealth Plan: Two Plans and Where They Might Lead, WALL ST.J., Sept. 23, 1993, at
Al, A8.
49. 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(b) (1992).
50. HospitalProspective Payment System: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
51. DRGs appear to have been successful in holding down the costs of hospitalizing Medicare patients. Such expenses have slowed from an annual rate of
9.1% for the six years preceding the implementation of DRGs to 2.5% in the
first six years after their implementation. PROPAc REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
Questions remain, however, as to whether DRGs have truly succeeded only in
shifting costs to private patients and to services not covered by DRGs. Privately
insured hospital patients pay 28% more than do Medicare patients, and hospitals have boosted both their supply and cost of services not covered by DRGsoutpatient, psychiatric and rehabilitative services. Id. at 4, 24, 57; see also Wasted
Health Care Dollars, supra note 2, at 445 (suggesting that physicians will raise their
fees for services provided to privately insured patients in order to compensate
for reduced reimbursements from Medicare under recently announced Medicare
cost containment programs).
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idly to be regulated properly. These frauds have arisen primarily
because DRG reimbursement applies piecemeal: only to the rendering of some services (in-patient hospitalizations) for some patients (Medicare).
Cost shifting and inflation of costs have arisen because hospitals have coped with DRGs, in part, by inflating the costs they
bill to privately insured patients. Congressional hearings recently
focused on this practice and found examples such as: a $8.05
crutch charged to hospital patients at $103.65; a $.90 rubber arm
pit pad charged to hospital patients at $23.75; a $.71 rubber tip
charged to hospital patients at $15.95.52 This cost inflation is an
open, systematic, nation- and industry-wide practice. Hospital
administrators refer to it as the "cross subsidization" necessary to
make a profit. 5 3 In the long run, this cost inflation affects the
Medicare program even though the payment per Medicare patient is capped by DRGs and presumably unaffected by cost inflation. Each year DRG rates are renegotiated based, in part, on
54
prior hospital costs-including inflated costs.
Whereas fee for service reimbursement rewards for rendering, or allegedly rendering, a high volume of services, DRGs reward hospitals for admitting a high volume of patients. Thus,
DRGs carry the incentive for hospitals to increase volume by paying kickbacks to physicians for admitting their patients to one
hospital instead of another. This is a crime under the anti-kickback statute. 55 Kickbacks may be on the upswing thanks to a new
change in reimbursement of providers. In 1992, the equivalent of
52. Health Care Fraudand Waste, supra note 8, at 131 (statement of Chairman
Dingell). Chairman Dingell of the Senate Committee on Energy and Commerce
acknowledged that the impetus to hold the hearing was motivated, at least in
part, by recent media attention to the issue of health care fraud. Id.
53. Id. at 151, 180-216. Mr. David Jones, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Humana, Inc., one of the country's largest health care companies, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Id. at
180. Mr. Jones addressed the problems of cost containment and cross-subsidization: "[the] shrinking full charge segment bears an increasingly heavy portion
of the cost of hospital care rendered to other patients who do not pay their
share. Medicare is among the prime examples .... [I]t is first and foremost a
distributional problem-a problem of cross-subsidization." Id. at 183. Mr.
Jones later recognized that it is not the actual patient that bears the increased
cost, but the insurance companies. Id.
54. PROPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1991). The statute provides:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly, in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
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DRGs for physicians, known as Resource-Based Relative Value
Scale (RBRVS), went into effect. This scale caps the amount a
physician receives for treating Medicare patients and may increase the pressure on physicians to increase the volume of patients they handle. 56 One way the unscrupulous provider can
increase volume is to pay kickbacks to providers for referring
patients.
DRGs also encourage false diagnoses-of an ailment not covered by DRGs such as psychiatric disease, or "upcoding" a patient's condition to a diagnosis that carries a more substantial
reimbursement.
With DRGs, Medicare patients are discharged quicker and
sicker. Consequently, they receive more care at home. This has
led to a booming business, much of it fraudulent, in home health
care and medical equipment for the home.5 7 The typical home
which payment may be made in whole or in part under subchapter
XVIII or this chapter or a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering or arranging for or
recommending, purchasing, leasing or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care
program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend
purchasing, leasing, or ordering of any good, facility, service, or
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or
both.
Id.
56. Paul Raslavicus, M.D., The Reform of Medicare and Its Effect on Pathology, 99
512-14 (1993).
57. Robert Pear, Abuse Widespread in Medical Sales For Care at Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al, A15 [hereinafter Abuse Widespread]. "Changes in
the Medicare program since 1983 have drastically shortened the average hospital stay, creating new demand for medical equipment that can be used at home."
Id. Home care is "[o]ne of the fastest growing segments of the health care industry, and thus provides new opportunities for fraudulent health care providers
to exploit." Id. A spokesperson for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois estimated that the company lost about three million dollars a year to fraud and
abuse in the sale and rental of home medical equipment. Id.
PATHOLOGY PATTERNS
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health care fraud begins with a telephone solicitation from a
fraudulent provider. The caller attempts to give the impression
that he or she is with the federal government. The caller elicits
health information, and uses that information to obtain a Certificate of Need. Certificates of Need must be signed by a physician.
Some physicians falsely sign certificates because they are too busy
to pay attention. Others sign because they are paid for doing so.
Regardless, once the provider has a Certificate of Need, it delivers
the equipment and bills Medicare. This type of fraud has been
made easier by two aspects of the Medicare program: (1) there
are no standard definitions of medical equipment so providers
can easily "unbundle," that is, bill Medicare for each piece or
component of the equipment; and, (2) until 1992, home health
care companies providing equipment could bill the Medicare carrier where the order was received, rather than where the equipment was delivered. 58 This allowed shopping among carriers for
the highest reimbursement rate. Because the rates vary considerAn example of one such scheme involved the former owner of a television
rental business who filed at least 2,200 fraudulent claims in 1988, which cost the
Medicare program several million dollars. Health Care Fraud,supra note 1, at 36.
Specifically,
[the defendant's] plan relied on a telemarketing operation employing
teenage girls operating out -ofboiler rooms in Philadelphia-area shopping centers. The girls called local Medicare beneficiaries who had responded to newspaper advertisements offering a "free Medicare
covered package." The telemarketers would obtain the seniors' Medicare numbers and ask them if they had any physical complaints. If so,
the caller said, their firm could get equipment that would help.
Though Medicare requires beneficiaries to pay 20 percent of the cost of
any supplies, the seniors were told that Medicare would pay '100 percent for everything,' according to the complaint. Teenagers who had
no medical training were making medical diagnoses upon which sophisticated, expensive equipment was being purchased for patients that
neither needed nor wanted the equipment.
Id.
According to Edward Kuriansky, New York's special Medicaid-fraud prosecutor, fraud in home health care is attracting the "sharks" and is especially difficult to investigate "because you're talking about finding out what's going on
behind closed doors in hundreds of thousands of individual homes, where there
may be no other witness than an incompetent, vulnerable elderly person." Id. at
38.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 421.210(e)(1) (1992). The regulation provides in relevant
part:
[e]ach carrier is responsible, using the payment rates applicable or the
State of residence of the beneficiary, including a qualified Railroad Retirement beneficiary, for processing claims for items listed in paragraph
(b) of this section for beneficiaries whose permanent residence is within
the area designated in paragraph (c) of this section. A beneficiary's
permanent residence is the address at which he or she intends to spend
6 months or more of the calendar year.
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ably among the carriers, such shopping was very advantageous
for providers. 5 9
Even legitimate suppliers have been able to reap large profits
because of Medicare's inability to keep pace with the decreasing
cost of the rapidly changing technology needed in home health
care. For example, as recently as 1990, suppliers could purchase
a Trans Cutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulator (TENS), which
generates a pulsating electrical current to relieve pain, for seventy
dollars. Medicare reimbursed the supplier $475 per unit. 60 Profit
margins like this are like honey to bees. Now there are too many
bees. Between 6,000 to 7,000 companies sell home health equipment. 6 1 Only one-third of these belong to the industry's trade
association and most do not need a license to practice. 6 2 It is
alarmingly easy for these unregulated, unlicensed companies to
63
become Medicare providers.
59. Abuse Widespread, supra note 57, at Al, A15. For example:
while fraud occurs throughout the United States ... it varies in scope,
depending on... the amounts paid for various items. Private companies that work under contract and serve as the Government's agents in
reviewing and paying Medicare claims, have some discretion in setting
payment levels. The 34 Medicare agents .. .have paid widely varying
amounts for the same ... items in different parts of the country.
Id.
60. Id. Due to rapid technological advances, the cost of such items has decreased equally as rapidly since the early 1980s when Congress and federal
agencies set the reimbursement fees for such items. Id. Although Congress has
twice ordered a reduction in Medicare payments for such units, legislation and
promulgation of regulations has failed to keep up with the rapidly decreasing
cost of such items. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. In a 1990 report, the GAO discussed the inadequacy of state licensing of many free standing health care providers. The GAO noted that "[s]tates
have been slow to license freestanding providers. In fact states do not license or
otherwise regulate most of the 16 types of freestanding providers ....For those
freestanding providers that are licensed, however, states have imposed few sanctions for deficiencies identified during inspection." GAO, LIMITED STATE EFFORTS TO ASSURE QUALITY OF CARE OUTSIDE HOSPITALS 2 (1990).
The providers included in GAO's review were: Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Treatment Centers; Ambulatory Care, Psychiatric, Surgical Centers; Cancer
Treatment Centers; Cardiac Catheterization Laboratories; Rehabilitation Centers; Diagnostic Imaging Centers; Emergency Centers; General Diagnostic Centers; Home Health Care Services; Hospice Care; Clinical Laboratories; and, Pain
Control Centers. Id.
State officials interviewed by the GAO expressed concern about the adequacy of their ability to oversee these freestanding providers, questioned the
credentials and training of staff at these centers and "expressed concern about
the public's false presumption that freestanding providers are regulated." Id. at
25-26.
63. The GAO's report on the "rolling labs" $1 billion fraud in California
discusses how ease in securing provider numbers allowed this scheme to grow:
To avoid detection, rolling labs' operators relocated, changed names,
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As our experience with DRGs indicates, changes in a system
as complex and interconnected as health care causes fraud to
crop up in new and unanticipated ways. As the United States embarks upon health care reform much more dramatic than DRGs,
we must attempt to assess the impact of our reform efforts on
fraud by providers, and also, we must be wary of piecemeal
reform.

II.

THE OPTIMAL ANTI-FRAUD REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM

As opposed to the fee for service system of health care delivery and reimbursement, a capitation system 64 of managed competition discourages volume-enhancing types of fraud and contains
built-in checks that should help detect the types of fraud that will
occur instead. These positive aspects of a capitation-managed
competition system are amplified if uniform reimbursement and
billing procedures and mandatory copayments are also
implemented.
Because of the diversity of services patients need, any capitation system would likely result in groups of diverse providers organizing to service consumers. The level of care given to
enrolled members would be managed by each group of providers
so as to control costs while also (it is anticipated) meeting the
health care needs of the members.6 5 Most HMOs exemplify capitation reimbursement. Experience in the HMOs has shown that
the major way they monitor costs is by discouraging the rendering
of unnecessary services, especially expensive services such as hos66
pitalizations and referrals to specialists.
In a capitation reimbursement system, there is no incentive
and used a multitude of provider numbers. The U.S. Attorney concluded that, from 1981-87, the rolling labs' owners operated under at
least 30 different corporate names and Medicare provider numbers.
The owners used these different corporate names to obtain multiple
provider numbers ....
The ease with which laboratories obtain Medicare provider numbers
and the absence of medical licensing make it relatively easy for providers to obtain multiple provider numbers. Their use greatly complicates
carrier safeguard activities and thus enhances abusive providers' ability
to avoid having their unusual billing patterns detected. The ability to

easily obtain new numbers also helps abusive providers avoid Medicare's efforts to recover overpayments.
ONE SCHEME ILLUSTRATES VULNERABILITIES To FRAUD, supra note 5, at 8.

64. The "McDermott" Plan, for example, encourages a capitated reimbursement mechanism. H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 303, 612(a)(2)
(1993).
65. STARR, supra note 18, at 40-42.
66. Id.
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to overutilize services. Thus, for the fraudulent provider, there is
no incentive to engage in the types of fraud that flourish in a fee
for service system. With capitated payments, however, there are
incentives to commit the following types of fraud: submit false
cost data to obtain a higher capitation rate; register fictitious enrolles; underprovide necessary services; and, pay kickbacks for referrals of certain patients-healthy patients. 67 Part III addresses
the significance of this trade-off in fraud incentives.
Managed competition is the second characteristic of the optimal anti-fraud health care system. Under "managed competition" providers compete among themselves to obtain enrollments
of consumers. 68 Consumers decide on the provider with which
they will enroll from information about the competing providers. 69 The competition is "managed" in that an entity (the government, a private entity or a commission composed of
governmental and private interests) develops guidelines for the
competition between managed care groups. According to several
of the current proposals, for example, these guidelines include a
required standard benefit package70 and a ban on discrimination
against persons with chronic health problems. 7 1 Any providers
wishing to compete for enrollments must comply with the guidelines. Because providers compete with each other for periodic se67. PractitionerFraud and Abuse, supra note 9, at 418-20 (suggesting that, regardless of payment structure of government medical programs, creation of
strict norms for determining necessity and adequacy of health care rendered is
necessary to successfully detect and prove health care fraud). For a discussion of
the potential fraudulent activities that may be committed under a capitation
plan, see infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
68. See generally STARR, supra note 18, at 47-50.
69. President Clinton's proposal for national health care reform recognizes
the importance of allowing individuals to choose their own health care providers. Adam Clymer, Clinton Asks Backing for Sweeping Change in the Health System,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at AI, A21. "We have to leave some choice in this
system because Americans want to be able to pick their own doctors .... " Id. at
A21 (quoting President Clinton). In addition to a choice of health care providers, President Clinton has identified five other guiding principles that must drive
health care reform legislation: health care security; guaranteed savings; simplification of the health care system; high quality health care; and, individual responsibility for health. Id.
70. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1101-1128 (1993) (the
"Clinton" Plan). Other plans have similar provisions. See, e.g., H.R. 1200, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-203 (1993) (the "McDermott" Plan); H.R. 3222, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1202 (1993) (the "Cooper" Plan); S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1113 (1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan).
71. H.R. 3600, S. 1757 § 1402(a)-(c) (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 1200
§ 301(b)(1)(A) (the "McDermott" Plan); H.R. 3222, § 1204 (the "Cooper"
Plan); H.R. 3080 § 1 l01(b)(l)(B) (the "House Republican" Plan); S. 1770
§ 1112 (the "Senate Republican" Plan).
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lection by consumers, there is an existing incentive for the plans
to control their costs while also providing quality care. If a plan
fails to control the costs of treating its members, another plan
with better cost controls will be able to offer the standard benefit
package at a lower rate and may be chosen at the next enrollment
period. Similarly, the members of a plan that provides poor quality care would be expected to select another plan at the next enrollment opportunity.
The third feature of the optimal anti-fraud health care system
is the creation of a uniform billing and payment system-or as
close to a uniform system as is possible. Our experience thus far
with a multi-payer system demonstrates the importance of this
feature. Currently, there are over 1000 payers, private and public, that process 4 billion claims per year to pay hundreds of
thousands of providers using different payment methods and billing regulations. 72 As noted by the General Accounting Office,
"[t]he health care insurance system is a myriad of health care payers and methods of reimbursing providers. This complex system
73
itself becomes an impediment to detecting fraud and abuse."
Uniformity in billing and reimbursement policies would decrease honest mistakes, increase the ability of law enforcement as
well as honest employees, patients, and auditors to detect fraud,
72. VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 1, at 13-14. Even within one program,
Medicare, the different Medicare carriers reimburse at "widely varying amounts
for the same or similar items." Abuse Widespread, supra note 57, at Al, A15. The
problems with the Medicare Secondary payer program are a prime example of
how fraud is encouraged by a multi-payer system. This program requires that
providers treating Medicare patients who also have private insurance seek reimbursement first from the private insurer. Only if the private insurer cannot pay
is the provider to seek coverage from Medicare. Too often, however, providers
do not seek to collect from private insurers. This failure is due to several factors: providers have been lax in collecting information about primary insurers,
Medicare carriers have been "grossly inefficient" in monitoring the possible
presence of primary insurance, and private insurers have "capitalized on [these]
gross inefficiencies to evade obligations to pay primary claims to Medicare."
Health Care Fraud/MedicareSecondary Payer Program: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, Senate Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1990) (opening statement of Senator Roth).
The Department of Health and Human Services has recommended a
number of management and accounting steps that should be taken to remedy
this problem including: requiring employers to notify the Medicare program of
covered employees over 65, maintaining a clearinghouse for such claims, revising Medicare claim forms, and issuing stricter instructions to Medicare carriers
regarding claims on Medicare recipients possibly covered by private insurance.
Id. at 16. All of these steps are wise and overdue. The point, however, is that
the Medicare Secondary payer problem arose because of our multi-payer system
and the resulting manipulation among payers to shift costs.
73. VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra note 1,at 13.
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and render less persuasive untruthful defense claims of confusion
and mistake. Uniformity in billing and reimbursement also would
enhance the opportunity to detect aberrant provider patterns.
Use of such patterns is an invaluable technique for targeting abusive providers and proving fraud.7 4 In addition, uniform reimbursement policies would discourage current efforts by some
providers to manipulate regional disparities in reimbursement. 75
Although several of the current proposals for reform call for
steps that will help in standardizing billing procedures and claim
forms, 76 opportunities for billing diversity will continue to exist.

Such diversity will remain a problem, either by creating confusion
on the part of providers or by,making it easier to conceal fraud,
primarily with regard to providers who service areas large enough
to be covered by multiple billing practices. It is beyond the intent
of this Article to weigh the advantages of allowing diversity in billing to exist against the disadvantages of confusion and potential
for fraud that such diversity would create. If, however, diversity
in billing practices exists throughout the United States, care
should be taken to monitor closely providers that service large
geographical areas.
The fourth and last component of the optimal anti-fraud
health care system is requiring copayments from all financially
able patients. 77 Copayments serve to neutralize the third party
payer component of our current, and presumably our future,
health care systems. The fact that a third party to the rendering
74. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1984)
(discussing use of peer group comparisons to target providers for investigation),

cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 123944 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that statistical evidence of billing and reimbursement
patterns by peer group doctors is relevant and admissible in health care fraud
prosecutions); cf Mark A. Johnson, Comment, Computer Printouts As Evidence:

Stricter Foundation or Presumption of Reliability?, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 439, 459-61
(1992) (discussing admissibility of computer generated statistical evidence).
75. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
76. The Clinton proposal, for example, calls for standardizing claim forms.
H.R. 3600, S.1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5130 (1993). Standardizing benefits
and nationwide supervision by a commission or board will make standardizing
claim forms more feasible. Several of the current proposals include these features. See, e.g., Id. §§ 1101, 1151-1154 ("the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 3222, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1202, 1301-1313 (1993) (the "Cooper". Plan); H.R. 1200,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201, 401 (1993) (the "McDermott" Plan); S.1700,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1112 (1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan); H.R. 3080,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1101 (1993) (the "House Republican" Plan).
77. A copayment is a payment by the consumer of a portion of the charge
for health care services rendered. The Clinton Plan, for example, explicitly requires copayments, which it refers to as "cost sharing." H.R. 3600, S. 1757
§§ 1131-1136.
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of health care services pays the bill encourages fraud. The third
party's inability to know what was actually provided makes fraud
easier to commit and harder to prove.7 8 Short of requiring every
patient to pay his or her health care expenses out of pocket,
copayments are the most efficient way of alleviating the potential
for fraud posed by a third party payer system. Requiring copayments should not only encourage patients to examine their health
care bills more closely, but should also help deter an unscrupulous provider who thinks that the payer will never know what
services were actually provided. 79 For patients to be effective
watchdogs, however, bills, claim forms, and insurance coverage
must be simplified. If a patient is covered by several insurers and
receives multiple bills from providers who themselves are paid by
multiple insurers with different billing requirements, it becomes
virtually impossible to determine which charges go with which
services. Standardizing and clarifying claim forms and reimbursement procedures should help patients become more effective
monitors of fraud.
Requiring deductibles, whereby patients pay an out-ofpocket amount before their insurance kicks in to cover their
health care costs, would not encourage patients to monitor the
billing by their provider as effectively as would copayments because a deductible is paid up front and not per bill. Because of
the strong incentives for fraud, waste and abuse in fee for service
reimbursement, copayments rather than deductibles are needed if
a fee for service reimbursement system is retained.
There are disadvantages to copayments vis A vis deductibles:
copayments can be more difficult to collect and consumers who
are heavy users of provider services would be harder hit than if a
uniform deductible was collected. Despite these problems, however, the benefits of enlisting citizen-watchdogs to monitor fraud
and restoring more citizen responsibility, which can be fostered
by copayments, outweigh the problems posed by copayments.
To summarize, the optimal anti-fraud health care system contains a capitation reimbursement system whereby groups of prov78. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 863-64, 878; VULNERABLE PAYERS, supra
note 1, at 3. Editing and reviewing claims prior to payment, however, may provide the third party with some protection against fraudulent billing. Fraud by
Fright, supra note 5, at 15.
79. Copayments also should help curb overutilization. For example, if a
patient is paying a portion of the bill each time he visits the doctor or has the
doctor perform tests, the patient may be somewhat discouraged from visiting
the doctor as frequently as he may if he were not paying anything.
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iders compete with each other within prescribed guidelines to
supply health care; copayment requirements for all financially
able patients; and, standardized reimbursement and billing
procedures.
III.

FRAUD ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIMAL ANTI-FRAUD SYSTEM

Even within the optimal anti-fraud system described in Part
II, incentives remain for four major types of fraud by providers:
submission of false cost data in hopes of obtaining higher capitation rates; enrollment of fictitious members; underprovision of
necessary services while misrepresenting that all needed services
have been provided; and, paying kickbacks for referrals of healthy
patients.80

Capitation payment creates the incentive to submit false cost
data to the entity negotiating the capitation rate because by doing
so providers can obtain a higher rate. Unfortunately, false cost
reporting is among the most difficult types of health care fraud to
detect and prove. 8 ' For example, it is difficult to prove that the
cost report actually includes the improper expense. Generally,
this is an accounting issue and the accountant preparing the cost
report must demonstrate how particular expenses are recorded in
the expense provider's journal and carried forward to the cost report. 82 If the books, records, or testimony needed to prove this
fact are unavailable, as is often the case, it will not be possible to
prove the falsity of a cost report.
Another problem in proving submission of a false cost report
is demonstrating that a particular person knew that the report was
false. The actual preparer of the report may credibly claim ignorance, legitimately or not, because she likely received cost information from others. The supplier of the actual cost information,
assuming that person can even be identified within a large organization, can also credibly claim ignorance, incompetence, or good
faith error on the grounds that he was not involved in the actual
cost report preparation. Such claims of ignorance are credible
80. For a discussion of the submission of false cost data, see infra notes 81104 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the enrollment of fictitious
members, see infra note 105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
underprovision of necessary services, see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the payment of kickbacks for the referral of healthy
patients, see infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
81. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 908-14.
82. But see United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1977) (controller of hospital testified to accounting entries resulting from instructions
given to him by defendant-officer of hospital).
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because of the complex regulations applicable to cost reporting,
and the expertise and specialization needed by cost report
83
preparers.
83. Reported cases reveal how the government may attempt to prove that a
defendant, who may not have been involved in preparing the cost report or recording expenses, knew that the improper expense was actually included as a
proper expense in the cost report.
In United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 780 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 817 (1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this knowledge issue and explained what evidence would suffice to
prove it:
It is not necessary that [the defendant] have known which line was incorrect when he approved the [cost report] forms, nor that he be able
to properly fill out the forms himself... .It suffices that he understood
the forms necessarily to include expenses which were not those of the
hospital, and that a percentage of the amount claimed would be reimbursed erroneously to the hospital from [the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare].
Id.
A defendant's knowledge also can be shown circumstantially. For example,
knowledge has been proven by evidence that the defendant knew the general
method by which the Medicare reimbursement program worked. See, e.g., United
States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming defendant's fraud
conviction based on evidence defendant was familiar with mechanics of government funding programs), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Smith, 523 F.2d at 774
(affirming defendant's fraud conviction based on testimony that established defendant knew general method of Medicare reimbursement program); Commonwealth v. Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955, 958 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (noting
defendant's experience and familiarity with procedures for reimbursement from
Medicaid as factor in affirming fraud conviction). Knowledge also has been established where the defendant approved all checks for the improper expenses
and these checks were taken to him for his approval. See, e.g., Smith, 523 F.2d at
775 (upholding fraud conviction where defendant retained complete financial
control of hospital and evidence showed hospital money was used to remodel
defendant's home). The courts have found the requisite knowledge element
where the defendant accepted delivery and endorsed many of the checks payable
for improper expenses. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 804 (5th
Cir. 1979) (affirming defendant's fraud conviction based on evidence that defendant accepted reimbursements for travel when in fact no travel had been conducted). Moreover, knowledge has been shown where the defendant's
exculpatory explanations for how these expenses were handled are contradicted
by the facts. See, e.g., Smith, 523 F.2d at 774 (rejecting defendant's claim that
simple bookkeeping mistakes were made when evidence showed hospital money
was used to remodel defendant's home). Knowledge also has been shown by
evidence that the defendant failed to supply his accountant with accurate information or instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1272
(9th Cir. 1977) (affirming fraud conviction where defendant solicited payment
for undocumented expenses from hospital controller); Minkin, 436 N.E.2d at
958 (affirming fraud conviction where evidence showed defendant failed to instruct accountant to segregate, in cost reports, personal expenses from hospital
expenses).
Proving that supporting documentation has been falsified to help
conceal the misrepresentation in the cost report may help demonstrate
the defendant's knowledge of fraud. For this to be successful, there
must be credible evidence that the defendant directed or participated in
the falsification. Finally, it should be noted that when employees of the
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A third problem in proving submission of a false cost report
is how to plead the offense properly. Historically, a number of
criminal statutes have been used to charge this fraud. 84 When
86
prosecuted in the federal courts, false statements, 8 5 mail fraud,
conspiracy, 8 7 transporting in interstate commerce money obdefendant are used to provide evidence of the defendant's knowledge,
the prosecution may encounter ...

Fraudby
84.
102 has
85.

credibility problems ....

Fright, supra note 5, at 912.
Fraudby Fright, supra note 5, at 912-13 (text accompanying footnotes 84been adapted from the author's previous article Fraud by Fright).
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). The statute provides:
Whoever ...

knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers

up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact or makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses
any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
Id. Several health care fraud cases have been brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
See, e.g., United States v. Alemany Riyera, 781 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 1985)
(charging defendant under § 1001 with submitting, and causing to be submitted,
false Medicare cost reports), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986); Huber, 603 F.2d at
390 (charging defendant under § 1001 with making, and causing to be made,
false, fictitious and fraudulent statements to Department of Health, Education
and Welfare);Jones, 587 F.2d at 804 (affirming defendant's § 1001 conviction for
knowingly submitting false statements to Department of Health, Education and
Welfare); Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277 (holding evidence sufficient to sustain conviction under § 1001 for making false statements to government); Smith, 523 F.2d
at 773 (affirming defendant's conviction under § 1001 for knowingly submitting
false statements to Department of Health, Education and Welfare); United
States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same); United States v.
Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.NJ. 1978) (same).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984). The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses . . . places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or

imprisoned not more than five years or both. If the violation affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
Several cases have applied the mail fraud statute to defendants accused of
health care fraud. See, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390 (charging defendant with using mails to defraud hospitals and government); United States v. Collins, 596
F.2d 166, 167 (6th Cir. 1979) (charging defendant with using mails to defraud
Medicare reimbursement system); Cella, 568 F.2d at 1277 (charging that defendant with using mails to defraud hospitals and government); Simon, 510 F. Supp.
at 233-44 (charging that defendant mailed or caused to be mailed false and
fraudulent Medicaid cost reports to government agency).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1966). The statute provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both ....
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tained by fraud,8 8 RICO, 8 9 theft of government property, 90 tax
evasion, 9 ' and filing false tax returns and aiding and abetting in
Id. Several health care fraud cases have been brought under this statute. See,
e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 390 (affirming defendant's conviction for conspiring to
defraud government in its administration of Medicare, Medicaid and Hill-Burton
programs); Jones, 587 F.2d at 804 (affirming defendant's conviction for conspiring to defraud United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare);
Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277 (affirming defendant's conviction for conspiring to defraud United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare); United
States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (charging defendant with conspiring to defraud government by submitting and causing submission of false
cost reports for Medicare and Medicaid payments to nursing home); Braunstein,
474 F. Supp. at 3 (charging defendants with conspiring to defraud government
and Internal Revenue Service by filing false Medicaid cost statements and false
tax returns for nursing home).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970 & Supp. 1993). The statute provides in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transports
or causes to be transported, or induces any person or persons to travel
in, or be transported in interstate or foreign commerce in the execution
or concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person or those
persons of money or property having a value of $5,000 or more....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years or both.
Id. For an example of a health care fraud case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2314,
see Huber, 603 F.2d at 390 (charging defendant with transporting stolen money
in interstate commerce under § 2314).
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1984 & Supp. 1992) (prohibiting racketeering
or any benefit therefrom whereby racketeering includes, but is not limited to,
mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property). For an example of a
health care fraud case brought under §§ 1961-1963, see Huber, 603 F.2d at 390
(affirming defendant's conviction for conducting enterprise affairs through pattern of racketeering activity under §§ 1961, 1962(c), and 1963).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976). The statute provides in relevant part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his
use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or
being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen
purloined or convertedShall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; but if the value ... does not exceed the sum of $ 100,
he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
Id. For a case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 641, see Cella, 568 F.2d at 1277 (charging defendant with theft of government property under § 641).
91. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1989). The statute provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in
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their preparation 9 2 have been used. When prosecuting in state
94
courts, attempted larceny by false pretense, 9 3 Medicaid fraud,
theft, 95 conspiracy, 96 and falsifying business records have been
used. 97 Prosecution under any of these statutes presents
problems of multiplicity and duplicity. Multiplicity is charging a
single offense in several counts. Duplicity is joining in a single
count two or more offenses. 98 A multiplicitous indictment may be
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years or
both, together with the costs of prosecution.
Id. Several cases of health care fraud have been brought under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201. See, e.g., Celia, 568 F.2d at 1277 (affirming defendant's conviction for tax
evasion by failing to pay taxes on embezzled money); United States v. Smith, 523
F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975) (charging defendant willfully attempted to evade
paying taxes on alleged embezzled money).
92. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)-(2) (1989). The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) DECLARATION UNDER PENALTIES OF PERJURY. -Willfully makes
and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the
penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter; or
(2)

AID OR ASSISTANCE. -

Willfully aids or assists in, or procures,

counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a
return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is
false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is
with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to
present such return, affidavit, claim or document ....
Id. For cases applying this statute to health care fraud violations, see Cella, 568
F.2d at 1277 (affirming defendant's conviction for filing false income tax returns
and aiding and abetting preparation of false income tax returns); Smith, 523 F.2d
at 773 (charging defendant made and subscribed to false income tax returns for
exempt organization).
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Mass. 1977)
(charging that annual reports of nursing home that were submitted by defendant
to Rate Setting Commission contained material falsehoods); United States v.
Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (affirming defendant's convictions for attempted larceny by false pretense for submission of false reimbursement reports to Rate Setting Commission); People v. Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d
947, 948 (1980) (charging defendant submitted false claims to Medicaid resulting in lost between one and three million dollars).
94. See, e.g., Greco v. State, 515 A.2d 220, 221 (Md. 1986) (charging defendant included non-reimbursable expenses in annual cost reports submitted
to Medicaid).
95. Id. at 220 (charging that defendant received non-reimbursable expenses
due to falsifying annual cost reports submitted to Medicaid).
96. Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 948 (charging that defendant conspired with his
two sons to submit false claims to Medicaid that resulted in defrauding Medicaid
program between $1 and $3 million dollars).
97. Id.
98. See generally United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.
1976) (holding admissibility problem particularly significant where conspiracy
charged due to evidentiary rules about declarations by co-conspirators), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 142 (1982). Duplicity and multiplicity rules concern the fundamental due pro-
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dismissed because it subjects a defendant to double jeopardy. 9 9
A duplicitous indictment may be dismissed because of the danger
that the jury would "find a defendant guilty on a count without
having reached a unanimous verdict on the commission of a particular offense."' 0 0 Properly pleading this offense becomes difficult when one document contains multiple false statements,' 0 '
although generally it is appropriate to plead each false statement
as a separate count whenever different facts are needed to prove
the falsity. Nevertheless a statute appropriately drafted to cover
02
all health care fraud would alleviate this problem.'
Despite the difficulties for law enforcement that false cost reporting presents, two aspects of the health care system suggested
in Part II should serve as built-in checks on some fraudulent cost
reporting. If capitation reimbursement is implemented nationwide, applicable to every potential patient and covering all services, there will be no incentive to falsify the costs applicable to
noncovered persons or services. As noted previously, providers
currently inflate costs in part to shift from a "dry" reimbursement
source to a more lucrative one.' 0 3 In a capitation system, in
cess rights of defendants. Id. Duplicity reflects the fear that a jury may find a
defendant guilty where they may not have reached a verdict on commission of an
actual offense. Id. This principle would conflict with substantive Sixth Amendment rights of the accused and possibly prejudice a double jeopardy defense. Id.
99. See generally United States v. Conn, 716 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that defendant cannot be charged with possession or receipt of several
weapons received at same time and same place).
100. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d at 835; see also United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d
771, 774 (9th Cir.) (noting that duplicitous indictment precludes assurance of
jury unanimity and may preclude subsequent double jeopardy defense), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Aguilar, 756 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th
Cir. 1985) (noting that duplicity in indictment would constitute reversible error
only if defendant was misled to his prejudice).

101. 9

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

U.S.

ATTORNEY'S

MANUAL

§ 9-40.170

(1985); Id. §§ 9-42.220 to 42.221 (1984). The general rule is that as long as
different facts are needed to prove each false statement, each false statement
constitutes a separate count. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) (holding that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not"); United States v. Schrenzel, 462 F.2d
765, 771 (8th Cir.) (noting "the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one is whether each count requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972).
102. The Clinton Plan, for example, proposes a new criminal statute aimed
at health care fraud. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5431 (1993).
As drafted, this proposed statute would cover submission of false cost reports
but does not clarify the multiplicity/duplicity problem. Id.
103. For a discussion of how DRGs have led to cost shifting in hospitals,
see supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
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which a vertically integrated group of providers assumes responsibility for all health care services needed by a patient, there will
be no incentive to shift costs and thus no incentive to inflate the
costs not limited by capitation.
The more significant check on submission of false cost data,
however, is the competition among providers. When multiple
providers submit cost data to the entity negotiating the capitation
rate, inflation of costs by one provider should be obvious. The
danger lies in collusion among the providers. Because collusion
tends to exist more frequently in a field with few competitors,
care should be taken in crafting health care reform to ensure that
04
sufficient numbers of provider groups compete.
The second type of fraud for which incentives will exist in the
health care system suggested in Part II is registration of fictitious
enrolles by providers. Because payments to providers are made
per enrolle, there is incentive for the unscrupulous provider to
inflate the number of persons enrolled. Registering of fictitious
enrolles should be easy to prevent, however, by allocating the responsibility for enrolling consumers to the government (or quasigovernment) entity that organizes the competition rather than to
the providers. 10 5 With or without this structural safeguard, enrollment of fictitious persons should be easy to detect through
use of sufficient registration information and computer databases,
both of which would be more available and convenient with a uniform reimbursement and billing system.
The third type of fraud for which incentives will exist in the
health care system suggested in Part II is the underprovision of
104. See ANTITRUST, THE MARKET, AND THE STATES: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
WALTER ADAMS 1 (James W. Brock & Kenneth G. Elzinga eds., 1991). Collusion
is generally addressed by antitrust regulation in monopolistic or oligopolistic
market structures. Id. at 165. In a chapter on structural tests aimed at promoting workable competition and effective business performance, Adams has argued that in the absence of competitive variables or direct government
interference, industries generally lack the necessary compulsions militating market reforms in the public interest. Id. Although Adams has warned against
heavy regulation, he has argued that powerful oligopolies-like the current
health care industry-will usually attempt to shield questionable performance
from public interference or at least allow reform only through piecemeal efforts.
Id. at 167. Where the discipline of competitive market structure is imposed, dramatic changes in performance and efficiency may occur, as evidenced by the reformation of the steel industry in the late 1950s. Id.
105. The Cooper Plan, for example, does this by specifying that the
"Health Plan Purchasing Cooperative" (HPPC) enroll and disenroll individuals
with the "Accountable Health Plan" (AHP). H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 1101(d)(l)(C), 1102(f) (1993). The McDermott Plan similarly specifies that
the states, through their "state health security program," enroll individuals for
health care benefits. H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(b), 103 (1993).
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necessary services. This becomes fraud if reimbursement is obtained upon the false representation that all necessary services
have been provided. Any capitation form of payment makes underproviding of necessary services lucrative. In a capitation system, a provider is paid a set amount per patient to render health
care services to each patient for a given time period. By skimping
on services provided, the provider makes money.
This is one of the most difficult types of fraud to prove. 10 6
To demonstrate that a provider failed to provide necessary services is hard enough given the subjectiveness of the practice of
medicine. But, to prove that such a failure was an intentional act
so as to maximize reimbursement is extremely difficult. Once
again, however, the managed competition component of the
health care system suggested in Part II becomes significant. It
does so in two ways. First, efforts by a provider to profit by opting not to provide necessary services are successful only if done
on a large scale. A failure to care properly for the health needs of
large numbers of ill consumers enrolled in a provider group will
not remain a secret. Complaints and malpractice claims will lead
consumers to choose another group at the next enrollment period. This built-in check becomes ineffective, however, if many or
all providers begin to underprovide services. Again, to avoid this
potential for collusion, care should be taken to ensure that a sufficiently large number of providers compete to service consumers.
The second way managed competition counters the incentive
in a capitation system to underprovide necessary services also
could help prevent collusion. To make enrollment decisions,
consumers will need access to information about the quality of
care by alternative providers. Several current proposals call for
more effective measurements and communication of quality of
care.' 0 7 Public dissemination of such information should help detect any collusion to underprovide necessary services, as well as
enhance consumers' ability to avoid or disenroll from groups that
typically underprovide.
The last type of fraud for which incentives will exist in the
106. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 920-33.
107. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1327, 1386,

5001-5013 (1993) (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 3222 §§ 1303,

1304 (the

"Cooper" Plan); H.R. 1200 §§ 501-504 (the "McDermott" Plan). See generally A
New Frameworkfor Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A22. For an excellent source discussing the need for and suggested ways to collect this information, see Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting Consumers Under Managed
Competition, in HEALTH AFF. 76 (1993).
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health care system suggested in Part II is paying kickbacks for referrals. This type of fraud should not be as much of a problem as
it currently is in our fee for service system, however. To understand why, we must examine how kickbacks work in a fee for service system. As noted previously, in a fee for service system, the
kickback typically flows from one provider to another for referrals
of patients who need services, or at least for whom services can be
billed.' 0 s In such a system, where volume of services translates
into money, kickbacks are designed to enhance volume of services. Common examples of such kickbacks include laboratories,
diagnostic centers and hospitals paying physicians for admitting
patients or referring specimens.' 0 9
In a capitation system, by comparison, a kickback would be to
encourage or reward referrals of healthy patients who require few
health care services but for whom the provider is paid the same
amount as it is paid for ill patients. If managed competition also
is implemented, a kickback would not flow from one provider to
another but from the provider (or the group of providers) to individual consumers, if consumers make their own enrollment decisions. If a representative of consumers (an employer, for
example) makes the enrollment decision for individual consumers, the kickback would flow from provider to consumer representative. Either way, the parties involved in the kickback are no
longer a few, close knit, health care providers. These differences
in the goal of and parties to the kickback mean two things, both of
which should help deter, or at least enhance the detection of,
kickbacks: (1) in a capitation-managed competition system, kickbacks will be difficult to consummate; and, (2) in such a system,
kickbacks will be difficult to hide.
When the kickback is from one provider to another, as it is in
a fee for service system, it takes place between two, or at most a
few, close knit professionals. In a capitation system of managed
competition, the kickback must flow from a provider (or a group
of providers, probably represented in the kickback endeavor by
one or a few persons) to thousands of individual consumers if individuals make their own enrollment decision. Payments to so
many people are logistically difficult and virtually impossible to
conceal. If the enrollment decision is made by a representative of
individual consumers, then the kickback becomes somewhat eas108. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985)
(involving laboratory kickbacks in exchange for referrals).
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ier to manage because the provider (or provider representative)
need pay off only the representative of individual consumers."10
Nevertheless, even kickbacks to a representative will be more difficult to conceal than are kickbacks in our current fee for service
system with no competition. In the fee for service system, the
kickback can be hidden in legitimate payments already flowing between the providers. Providers paying and receiving kickbacks
have, or can arrange to have, legitimate business with each other.
The physician who is paid a kickback by a clinical laboratory
needs to refer the lab work on her patients somewhere. If the
physician refers it to the lab paying kickbacks to her, the kickbacks
can be hidden in the financial transactions legitimately existing
between the physician and laboratory.''' By comparison, it
would be extremely rare for a provider (or provider representative) and a consumers' representative in a managed competition
system to engage in independent, legitimate business dealings
wherein they could conceal kickbacks. Although managed com110. It also furthers the goal of managed competition more effectively if
individual consumers make the enrollment decisions themselves rather than having a representative make the decision for them as a group. If a group has to
make the uniform decision to change providers rather than permitting individual
choice, changes will infrequently occur, and if they did, some individuals will be
displeased. Consumers may avoid change for a variety of reasons. For example,
they may feel the health care provided is satisfactory. They may also stay with a
health care provider to avoid the disruption associated with changing enrollment. If individual change is avoid, the group as a whole will be chilled from
making changes or, if change is made, those preferring the status quo will be
equally displeased. Furthermore, group health plans under a managed competition system are logistically difficult. If large groups of consumers change at
once, patient files must be transferred and some expense and inefficiency is virtually inevitable.
Finally, the Clinton Plan emphasizes individual responsibility. H.R. 3600, S.
1757 § 1002. This goal will be defeated if a managed competition plan allows or
encourages a representative to act on behalf of consumers.
111. Case law favors the prosecution, holding that the payment is an illegal
remuneration even if it is in part reimbursement for legitimate services rendered, "if one purpose behind the fee was to improperly induce future services."
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985). Nevertheless, the commingling of legitimate and illegitimate purposes
for a payment makes it difficult to prosecute these cases. See generally David M.
Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals
Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1911 (1989) (discussing
viability of containing costs of Medicare and Medicaid programs in which providers jointly care for patients); cf United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp.
Rental Serv. Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 23-26 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant
could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit Medicare fraud only if payments
were primarily made for improper purpose); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105,
108 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding as correct trial court's admonition that jury could
not convict unless it found payment wholly and not incidentally attributable to
delivery of goods or services).
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petition would make kickbacks more difficult to accomplish, questions arising from the novelty of nationwide managed
competition would need to be resolved, such as whether the following constitute kickbacks: offering the standard benefit package at a lower cost than competitors; rebating a portion of a
provider group's year end profits to enrolled members; and/or
providing "perks" that also constitute good preventive care, like
free flu shots, nutritional counseling or athletic facilities.
There is one last advantage of the health care system suggested in Part II in preventing and detecting fraud. This system
offers the opportunity to rely more on the health care industry to
regulate itself. If done honestly, self-regulation is always cheaper,
more efficientand more effective than governmental regulation.
In their recent work, Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite 1 2 have extolled the virtues of self-regulation: Industry feels a greater commitment to preventing and detecting wrongdoing when it is
entrusted with monitoring. Self-regulation allows tailoring rules
to the needs of specific players in the industry. (Such individualization should be especially helpful in the health care industry
where there are so many different types of providers, insurers and
public interests.) Self-regulation allows an industry to move and
change as conditions change.' 13 Such flexibility is difficult to
achieve with governmental regulation yet, if there is any field in
which such flexibility will be needed in the years ahead, it is in
health care. Lastly, self-regulation is cheaper than governmental
regulation, which must employ a network of auditors, investigators, and enforcers. 114
The provider groups that would exist in a capitation-managed competition system provide a structure for greater self-regulation. Each group could monitor its employees to ensure that
they were not committing fraud by developing its own set of rules
and regulations to detect and deter fraud; by implementing an
education system for employees to ensure that they know how to
comply with all applicable requirements; by establishing a monitoring system to ensure that employees are complying with legal
requirements; and, by establishing an internal investigatory and
5
sanctioning mechanism to handle instances of alleged abuse.'
112. IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 1 (1992)
[hereinafter RESPONSIVE REGULATION].
113. Id. at 110-16.
114. Id.
115. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission went into effect on November 1, 1991.
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There would be opportunity for great variety in the anti-fraud,
anti-waste and anti-abuse programs developed by the groups.
Each group could determine the extent to which it would rely on
tools such as training sessions, unannounced inspections, hotlines, ombudsmen, internal and external audits, and discipline of
aberrational employees. 1 6 These provider groups also would
have the expertise to supervise the practice of medicine, a difficult
and subjective task at best. Such supervision is essential, however, to ascertain whether all necessary services have been provided and to detect fraudulent provider practices.
Because self-regulation has the built-in weakness of leaving
the fox to guard the hen-house, some supervision of the self-regulator is needed. John Braithwaite and Ian Ayers propose a
model of "enforced self-regulation" whereby industry submits its
rules and regulatory scheme to the appropriate governmental
agency for approval.'17 The agency then suggests changes or
amends the rules before approving them. Once approved, the
government enforces the rules against that industry or against
that player in the industry. The type of supervising agency
needed for this "enforced self-regulation" model to work already
exists in the managed competition model of health care. Several
of the current proposals, for example, include a national health
board that would devise guidelines by which groups of providers
compete as well as supervise their operation.' 18 Reviewing and
supervising the implementation of anti-fraud programs by providers would be consistent with the other duties of a national supervisory health board. Serious instances of fraud, waste and abuse
would be referred by the alliances or the board to law enforcement agencies.
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Ch. 8, Introductory Comment (3d ed. 1992). They allow organizations convicted of crimes to reduce substantially their punishment by
demonstrating use of many of the programs suggested herein. Id.
116. Steven F. Molo, Some PracticalConsiderationsin Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 375 passim (1993) (discussing internal compliance programs); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, linimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1637-45 (1990) (evaluating techniques used in internal compliance programs).
117. RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 112, at 131-32.
118. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1501-1552
(1993) (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1301-1313
(1993) (the "Cooper" Plan); S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1311-1313
(1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan); H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1108
(1993) (the "House Republican" Plan).
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Although presenting some benefits in detecting and deterring fraud, waste and abuse, the organizational structure needed
for a managed competition system of health care also presents
two potential problems from a fraud perspective. The first problem concerns the exclusion remedy. Exclusion, whereby a provider is excluded from participating in Medicare and Medicaid, 1 9
can be the equivalent of capital punishment because many providers face financial ruin if they are unable to treat Medicare and
Medicaid patients. 120 In our current system, most providers practice as individuals or in small groups, and thus exclusions, if they
occur, are on a small scale. 12 ' Although excluding a provider may
be disruptive for some patients, the disruption is usually minimal
because most patients can switch to another provider. 122 If man119. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1991); 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
Exclusion for Program-RelatedAbuses
13,927 (1993) [hereinafter MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID GUIDE]. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to
exclude providers from Medicare and Medicaid that have been convicted of program-related crimes or offenses relating to patient abuse. The Secretary has the
discretion to exclude providers that have:
" been convicted of fraud (other than program related fraud), obstruction of justice, controlled substance offenses;
* had their license to provide health care revoked or suspended or
have surrendered such a license while a formal disciplinary proceeding was pending;
" been excluded from participating in other federal or state programs;
* been found to have filed excessive charges or charges for unnecessary services;
* engaged in fraud and kickbacks;
* are controlled by an individual who has been sanctioned;
" failed to disclose required information;
" failed to supply requested information on subcontractors and
suppliers;
" failed to supply payment information;
* failed to grant immediate access to specified government officials;
" failed to take required corrective action; have defaulted on health education loan or scholarship obligations.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)-(c)(1991).
In most circumstances, mandatory exclusions are for five years. With few
exceptions, the Secretary determines the length of permissive exclusions. Id.
§ 1320(c)(3)(B)-(C).
120. See, e.g., Thorbus v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 901,904 n.7 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that physician, 60% of whose gross income came from Medicare and Medicaid patients, was excluded from Medicare and Medicaid programs); Ritter v.
Cohen, 797 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1986) (physician, 99% of whose patients
were eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, was excluded from Medicaid
program).
121. See, e.g., MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE, supra note 119,
13,927 (discussing exclusions).
122. Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is authorized to alter the period of mandatory exclusion "in the case of an individual
or entity that is the sole community physician or sole source of essential specialized services in a community." Id.
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aged competition 'is implemented, however, 'it is almost certain
that the majority of providers will practice in large, vertically inte-

grated groups.

123

Exclusion of such a large group of providers

would be disruptive and could make law enforcement officials reluctant to exclude deserving providers. To avoid this, three steps
should be taken if managed competition is implemented. First,
efforts should be made to ensure that law enforcement has sufficient tools to ferret out the individual malfeasors within a group

and exclude only these individuals. Piercing any organizational
structure requires access to sophisticated statutes,124 investigative
26
grand juries, 125 and power to conduct electronic monitoring
and grant immunity.' 27 Currently these tools are not as widely
available as would be needed in a managed
28

competition

system.
Second, the fact that exclusion will be applied more often to
large corporate providers as well as the fact that many of the
grounds for exclusion involve a conviction of a crime, 129 calls for
reassessing our current standards of corporate criminal liability.
These standards impose vicarious liability on fictional entities by
automatically imputing the criminal liability of corporate agents
to the corporation.' 30 With these standards, it is irrelevant
whether the illegal act was committed by a maverick employee
acting against corporate policy or was an act encouraged and pro1

123. STARR, supra note 18, at 50.
124. Cf Howard B. Klein, Fighting Corruptionin the Philadelphia Police Department: The Death Knell of the "Conspiracy of Silence," 60 TEMP. L.Q. 103, 103-06
(1987) (discussing need for sophisticated statutes like RICO to prosecute public
police corruption); Charles F.C. Ruff, FederalProsecutionof Local Corruption: A Case
Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1209-10 (1977)
(discussing need for, and existence within federal system of, "statutory framework" able to respond to "sophisticated, national or international crime").
125. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 107 (1986) (discussing the role of an "investigative" grand jury) [hereinafter GRAND JURY].
126. FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, CASES
AND MATERIALS 382-91 (4th ed. 1991).
127. GRAND JURY, supra note 125, §§ 9.06 to 9.08.
128. Id. For sources that discuss the extent to which these tools are available in the federal system, see id.; MILLER ET AL., supra note 126, at 382-91.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1) (conviction of program-related crimes);
§ 1320a-7(a)(2) (conviction relating to patient abuse); § 1320a-7(b)(l) (conviction relating to fraud); § 1320a-7(b)(2) (conviction relating to obstruction of an
investigation); § 1320a-7(b)(3) (conviction relating to controlled substance);
§ 1320a-7(b)(7) (fraud, kickbacks and other prohibited activities).
130. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing CorporateCriminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1102-05 (1991) [hereinafter Corporate Ethos];
see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 143 (1989); Brent
Fisse, Restructuring CorporateCriminal Law, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1983).
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moted by the corporation. 1 3 ' As a result of these standards of
criminal liability, it is difficult for corporations to plan (they never
know when a maverick employee may break the law); there is no
incentive in the criminal law for corporations to behave responsibly; the criminal justice system is perceived as arbitrary, which
diminishes the respect of citizens; and, prosecutorial discretion is
3 2
unfettered.
The rare circumstance where the entire provider group is
fraudulent and should be excluded points, to the third step that
should be implemented, if exclusion is to remain a viable remedy
in a managed competition system. Government regulators must
have resources to make exclusion as least disruptive as possible
for the members enrolled with the excluded provider. Such resources might include the power to install a trustee to operate the
excluded provider group during a transitional period, 3 3 and the
power to entice, reward (or possibly force) competing provider
groups to absorb quickly the consumers previously enrolled in
the excluded group.' 3 4

In addition to complicating the use of the exclusion remedy,
the organizational structure of a managed competition system has
the potential for large scale public corruption, a type of criminality not seen much in the heretofore privately operated health care
system.' 3 5 Those individuals employed by. the entity that manages the competition between providers will have many lucrative
opportunities to extort and accept bribes for favorable decisions
in qualifying, overseeing and disciplining the provider groups.
The organizing individual(s) of provider groups similarly will
131. Corporate Ethos, supra note 130, at 1102-05..
132. Id.; Pamela H. Bucy, OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before
the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 351-54 (1993).
133. Interestingly, the Cooper Plan appears to provide this authority to the
Health Care Standards Commission in regulating the "Health Plan Purchasing
Cooperatives" (HPPCs), but not to the HPPCs in regulating the "Accountable
Health Plans" (AHPs). See H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 101(e)(2)(B)
(1993) (the "Cooper" Plan) (HPPCs); Id. § 1,102(a)(3)(B) (AHPs). The Clinton
Plan provides that the Secretary of HHS may seek appointment as trustee for a
financially insolvent health care plan. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, §§ 1395-1396 (1993).
This power should be expanded to cover appointment as trustee in instances of
fraud or abuse.
134. In the Cooper Plan, the Health Care Standards Commission is to "establish a process for termination of agreements" with providers. H.R. 3222
§ 1102(a)(3).
135. For a study of the types of health care fraud historically prosecuted,
see Fraud by Fright, supra note 5,,at 882-933. This study reveals that public corruption prosecutions of health care providers have not been reported in published opinions. Id. .
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have opportunities to solicit and accept illegal payments for improper exercise of discretion to include individual providers in
the group and to negotiate the terms of the providers' participation. This potential means three things. First, the current proposals should take steps to keep these decision making processes
as public and accountable as possible. 3 6 Second, law enforcement should have the tools necessary to investigate public corruption (e.g., electronic monitoring, resources and training for
undercover operations). Third, statutes proscribing health care
fraud should address the potential for graft and corruption and
clarify ambiguities that currently render public corruption prosecutions difficult. 13 7 Questions unique to the health care system
also should be addressed, such as who in the "alliance," or
"purchasing cooperative," 138 is a "public official"' 3 9 and what
separates illegal pay-offs from legitimate contributions and
gifts.' 40 Preventive steps to deter extortion and bribery should be
136. The Cooper Plan, for example, begins to do this by requiring "network plans" (a provider group with certain characteristics) to select participating
providers based upon competitive criteria that are publicly available. H.R. 3222
§ 1202(a)(4). Additional steps could be taken such as: requiring oversight of
the provider selection process in each network plan by a fraud investigator or
auditor; educating providers as to which negotiating tactics are permissible and
which are not; and, ensuring the availability of hotlines and ombudspersons to
individuals participating in these negotiating processes, et cetera.
137. After McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991), the government must prove that there was a quid pro quo by the public official for the
payment in question. Id. at 1816. After Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881
(1992), the quid pro quo requirement seems to have been watered down. Id. at
1189. The United States Supreme Court's struggle with the quid pro quo question showcases the difficulty in distinguishing illegal payoffs from legitimate payments. For an excellent discussion of these difficulties, see Symposium:
Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1993); Michael
W. Carey et al., FederalProsecution of State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to
Punishing Breaches of the Public Trust and a ProposalforReform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 301, 308-09, 321-33 (1991-92).
138. According to the Clinton Plan, the entity that manages the competition among providers is an "alliance"; according to the Cooper Plan, it is a
"health plan purchasing cooperative" (HPPC); and, according to the Senate Republican Plan, this entity is a "purchasing alliance." H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1300-1330 (1993) (the "Clinton" Plan); H.R. 3222, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1101-1108 (1993) (the "Cooper" Plan); S. 1770, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1404 (1993) (the "Senate Republican" Plan).
139. Under most corruption statutes, the defendant must be a "public official," but not necessarily an elected public official. See, e.g., United States v. Freedman, 562 F. Supp. 1378, 1384-88 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (private citizens cannot be
prosecuted). But see United States v. Phillips, 586 F. Supp. 1118, 1120-23 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (private citizens can be prosecuted if victim reasonably believed defendant wielded governmental power). Early clarification of the status of the
various individuals in a reformed health care system will be vital to effective deterrence and regulation of corruption in health care.
140. See supra note 136.
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implemented such as educating the individuals employed by these
new health care entities as to which gratuities they can and cannot
accept and what kind of negotiating they can engage in with providers and what is outside proper bounds.
To summarize, a fee for service system contains the incentive
for the following types of fraud: billing for services not rendered;
misrepresenting the nature of the services rendered; providing
and billing for unnecessary services; and, paying kickbacks to induce referrals of services. All of these types of fraud arise from
the emphasis in fee for service reimbursement on volume. All of
these types of fraud are easy to commit and difficult to detect because they occur within the privacy of the patient-provider relationship or, in the case of kickbacks, between a small group of
close knit professionals.
In comparison to fee for service reimbursement, capitation
reimbursement discourages frauds that increase volume of services because the more services performed per patient, the more
money the provider loses. Thus, capitation reimbursement provides no financial incentive: to bill for services not rendered; to
misrepresent the nature of services rendered; to perform unnecessary services; or, to pay kickbacks to encourage referrals of
more services.
Capitation reimbursement, however, provides the financial
incentive to commit other types of fraud: to submit false cost data
to obtain a higher capitation rate; to enroll fictitious persons with
the provider; to underprovide services; and, to pay kickbacks for
referrals of certain types of patients. For each of the types of
fraud encouraged by the capitation method of reimbursement,
there are built-in checks supplied by other components of the optimal anti-fraud health care system proposed in Part II. The competition between providers, all of whom are reporting their costs
to the same entity, will serve as a check on the submission of false
cost data. Allowing consumers to "vote with their feet" by selecting another provider in the managed competition system serves
as a built-in check on kickbacks for referrals and the underprovision of necessary services. The copayment requirement heightens the interest of individual consumers to monitor the bills for
their health care. Uniform billing and reimbursement procedures
help avoid legitimate mistakes as well as fraud, prevent the enrollment of fictitious persons, and enhance the ability of consumers
and law enforcement to detect fraud.
The organizational structure needed for a managed competi-
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tion system offers the potential for more effective self-regulation
of fraud, waste and abuse by provider groups, but also, poses two
problems. Law enforcement may become less willing to employ
the exclusion remedy, which will have an amplified impact if providers practice in large groups as they will tend to do in a managed
competition system. In addition, the structure needed for managed competition presents potential for public corruption. Both
of these problems can be alleviated, somewhat, if sufficient cautionary steps are implemented with managed competition.
IV.

FRAUD ANALYSIS OF COLLECTION OPTIONS

Just as with the delivery and reimbursement aspects of health
care, there are incentives and disincentives for fraud in the various options for raising the funds needed to pay for health care.
The Clinton proposal, for example, estimates that its plan will
cost $700 billion,' 4 ' which is to be recouped through "sin" taxes,
reductions in the cost of the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
and mandatory premium payments from employers and/or workers. 14 2 There are accounting and normative questions inherent in
any collection-of-funds process. This Article does not seek to address these questions but focuses solely on the potential for fraud
posed by possible revenue-raising efforts and the subsidies that
may be given to some individuals and businesses.
In addressing the revenue-raising question, this Article examines the possible ways to collect funds from employers and/or
workers: (1) collect from employers 14 3 (for this fraud analysis, it
141. Howard Fineman, Clinton's Hard Sell, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 1993, at 34.
Critics in Clinton's own administration doubt whether the spending and savings
figures of the five-year, $700 billion plan add up to a net savings. Id.
142. Dana Priest, The Clinton Prescription, THE WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.,
Sept. 20-26, 1993, at 10, 11; A New Framework For Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1993, at A22. Employers would pay their share as a percentage of payroll.
Employers with more than 50 employees would pay no more than 7.9% of their

payroll toward health insurance. This amount would be reduced depending on
the businesses' size and workforce. For example, small firms where workers
make less than $12,000 per year would pay 3.5% of their payroll. Christopher
Connell, Clinton Health Plan Promises Affordable Coverage For All, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Sept. 11, 1993, at 7B. Self-employed workers would pay 100% of their
premium cost and the entire amount would be tax deductible. Id. Premiums are

currently expected to be $1,800 per individual and $4,200 per family. Id.
143. There are a variety of views on this. For example, the Clinton Plan
requires employers to pay a certain amount of the premium for each employee,
H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6121 (1993); and provides that both

the employee and the employer make premium payments to the premium collecting entity (alliance) in the event that the employee owes more than the em-

ployer has contributed. Id. § 6101 (family or employer pays family share of
premium). The Cooper Plan requires "small employers" to collect most em-
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does not matter if this is a levy on the employer, for example, as a
percentage of payroll, or on the employee, as a percentage of income earned from that employer); (2) collect from financial institutions on unearned income; or, (3) collect from individuals.
Combined use of the first two options is preferable from an
anti-fraud perspective, for two reasons. First, there will be fewer
payers (employers and financial institutions only) if the first two
options, versus the third, are implemented. This will make collection of funds easier. Second, it is more likely that employers and
financial institutions will be skilled and experienced in managing
money, calculating the amount of funds due, and filing financial
reports than are individual citizens, the payers in the third option. 144 The Clinton proposal, for example, which requires both
employers and employees to pay a percentage of premiums, follows Option 1.145 To ensure that non-working persons with
sources of unearned income pay their assigned share, Option 2
should also be implemented. The reallocation of funds, (i.e., subsidizing those who cannot afford to pay their assigned share)14 6 is
fraught with greater potential for fraud than is the revenue-raising effort, at least if the revenue is collected by way of Options 1
and 2 above.
It is safe to assume that those who qualify for exemption
from the health care premium payments, and thus are subsidized
by other taxpayers, will fall into four groups: (1) the employed
ployees' health care premium contributions, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1103(c) (1993). However, the Cooper Plan does not require the employer to
contribute to this premium that it collects. Id. § 1103(d). Small employers are
defined as employers normally employing fewer than 101 employees during a
typical business day. Id. § 1701(c)(2). Inexplicably, the Cooper Plan also provides for employees, whose withholding was not sufficient to cover the entire
cost of premiums, to pay "directly to the HPPC" the remaining amount. Id.
§ 1103(c)(2). This procedure not only will be cumbersome but also will be a
fertile ground for evasion by individuals. Collection of the full premium owed
by employees should be made by employers and paid directly to the HPPC, or
appropriate entity. The House Republican Plan states that "[ain employer is not
required ... to make any contribution to the pot of [health care] coverage" but
that employees may elect to have premiums owed by the employee collected
through payroll deductions. H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (a) (1993).
144. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial Flows in American Health

Care, in

HEALTH AFF.

172, 178 (Supp. 1993).

145. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6001-6131 (1993) (the
"Clinton" Plan).
146. The Clinton Plan, for example, provides for subsidies to individuals
and businesses unable to pay their allotted amounts. Id. §§ 6101-6131. The
Cooper Plan similarly provides for assistance to low income individuals. H.R.
3222, §§ 2001-2101. The McDermott Plan does not include subsidies because
only persons and entities with threshold incomes are taxed for health care. H.R.
1200 §§ 811-981.
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who are poor; (2) the unemployed who are poor; (3) the self-employed who are poor; and (4) businesses that are unable to pay
the full percentage of their employees' premiums. To qualify for
a subsidy, each of these individuals or businesses will have to
demonstrate financial neediness. Presumably this will be done by
filing financial data similar to filing an income tax return. This
means that in the health care subsidy program, as in traditional
tax fraud cases, there will be a potential for two types of fraud:
(1) individuals or businesses that fail to file the financial data required but seek health care coverage anyway; and, (2) individuals
and businesses who file false financial data to qualify for an exemption from the health care "tax" they would otherwise owe.
The failure-to-file problem can be deterred by requiring the filing
of an income tax return before one is eligible for any health care
services-subsidized or not. If an individual cannot see a physician without a health care card and cannot get a health care card
without filing an income tax return (or having one's employer file
on one's behalf), then there will be a strong, new incentive to file
47
income tax returns.
Implementing the second revenue-raising effort listed above,
requiring financial institutions to collect a percentage of
unearned income for health care premiums, is another way to reduce the incentive and opportunity not to file required financial
data. Much like the Form 1099, this step also will help highlight
nonfilers, or, at least those who keep their assets in financial
institutions.
The second type of fraud that is likely to occur in the subsidy
program is underreporting of income, much as is seen in typical
tax fraud cases. The individuals most likely to engage in this type
of fraud will be those self-employed or "unemployed" persons
with income from illegal sources or those with income that is difficult to trace (cash). The businesses that underreport income may
do so by falsely deflating their reported revenue or by falsely inflating their expenses or other deductions. Unfortunately, there
is no systemic mechanism to neutralize this incentive to underreport income. This type of fraud will have to be pursued through
traditional law enforcement efforts.
In conclusion, the optimal anti-fraud technique for collecting
health care premiums requires employers to collect and remit
147. Such a requirement may bring forth many individuals who have previously failed to file income tax returns. Tracking the prior income history of
these new filers could be of great interest to the IRS.
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their own share and their employees' share (or just the employees' share, should such a formula prevail). For this to work, deductions and other offsets against this contribution must be kept
to a minimum and reported through employers only. Any deductions or offsets requiring filings by individuals will render this option impossible. Financial institutions also must be required to
collect and remit a health care tax on all unearned income. Both
of these techniques are preferable to collecting health care premiums directly from individual taxpayers because they focus the collection effort on a smaller group of payers who are relatively
skilled money managers. Because the exemption from paying the
health care premium necessarily relies upon reporting of financial
data by individuals and businesses, there is greater risk of fraud in
the subsidy program. Fraud in reporting financial data needed to
qualify for subsidies will be difficult to detect and prove, although
requiring filing of financial data to obtain any health care services
would at least discourage non-filers.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIGHTING FRAUD

By

HEALTH CARE

PROVIDERS

The following recommendations assume that for the next
decade our health care system will be a hodge-podge, retaining
some vestiges of our current health care system and a variety of
reform programs. This is unfortunate from an anti-fraud perspective but probably inevitable because health care reform is
venturing into the unknown and must be adjusted along the way.
In addition, consideration of the financial and normative issues
inherent in health care reimbursement, delivery and taxation may
weigh in favor of adopting steps that encourage fraud and that
make fraud harder to detect. The following recommendations
recognize these realities and are offered to make the most of law
enforcement efforts within such an accommodation.
1. Recognize that fraud by health care providers will exist in
any health care system. Assess the incentives for specific types of
fraud in each component of the health care system and direct law
enforcement resources accordingly.
2. Recognize that with changes in a health care system, new
types and combinations of providers will enter the market quickly.
Strict controls on licensing and eligibility of providers should be
48
enforced.1
148. Several of the proposed plans take a step in this direction. The McDermott Plan, for example, requires that providers must be "licensed or certi-
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3. Expect to see the following types of fraud wherever fee
for service reimbursement is retained: billing for services not
rendered; misrepresentations regarding services rendered; providing unnecessary services; and, payment of kickbacks among
providers, including self-referrals. Limits on volume (either
through a cap on fees or paying reduced fees for services rendered once a certain volume is reached) may neutralize these incentives somewhat, but such limits do nothing to discourage
fraud prior to reaching the capped amount. Utilization limits,
whereby authorization must be obtained prior to rendering highly
abused or easy-to-abuse services, may help deter these types of
49
frauds. 1
4. Expect to see the following types of fraud by health care
providers in a capitation-managed competition system: false cost
reporting; efforts to inflate falsely the number of people enrolled
in an alliance or provider group; failure to provide necessary services; and, kickbacks to enroll healthy patients. In addition to the
built-in checks on these types of fraud supplied by managed competition, the following steps should be taken to deter and detect
these frauds:
A. Specify the individuals within each provider group
who must personally sign the report of costs submitted
during negotiations on capitation amounts. Ensure that
these individuals sign under penalty of perjury.
B. Allow only "certified health care accountants" to
prepare reports of costs. Require that to obtain this certification, accountants must receive specified training in
health care finance and fraud. Require that each cost report include certification that a compliance audit has
been conducted by a qualified health care accountant.
C.

Structure enrollment procedures so that the entity

fled" and meet all requirements of state and federal law to qualify as providers
entitled to reimbursement. H.R. 1200 § 302. The House Republican Plan also
requires full disclosure by insurers of rating practices for different populations
and benefit packages. H.R. 3080 § 1104(b). Before this is a viable check on
providers, however, state licensing and accreditation requirements must exist

and be enforced.

FRANK

P.

GRAD

& NOELIA

MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE AND

174-76 (1979) (suggesting changes in physician discipline); William
D. Morris, Revocation of Professional Licenses, 37 MERCER L. REV. 789 (1986) (reviewing state procedures for revocation of professional licenses and concluding
by noting deficiencies in these procedures).
149. For a fuller discussion of the need for such limits, see Health Care Fraud
and Waste, supra note 8, at 101.
DISCIPLINE
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regulating the providers enrolls consumers with a provider. Do not allow providers to enroll consumers. Establish data collection and retrieval systems to detect
fictitious enrollment of consumers. (This presupposes
implementation of uniform reimbursement and billing
procedures.)
D. Require that all enrollment decisions be made directly by consumers or in the case of incapacity, by
power of attorney or appointed guardians. Do not permit representatives of groups of consumers to make enrollment decisions.
E. To reduce the potential for collusion on reporting
of costs or underprovision of necessary services, ensure
that whenever possible, multiple providers, or multiple
groups of providers, compete for patient enrollments.
F. Utilize the opportunities for self-regulation by providers. Require that to qualify to compete for enrollment
by consumers, each group of providers must submit and
have approved an anti-fraud, waste and abuse plan.
Such a plan must address education, monitoring, detection and disciplining policies. In addition to their other
duties, the entities managing the competition among
providers should be charged with reviewing, approving
and enforcing these plans as well as making referrals for
prosecution in egregious instances.
G. Require that everyone who is financially able make
copayments. Simplify claim forms and require a patient's signature on the claim form before the claim is
submitted by the provider for reimbursement.
H. Recognize that if the poor are relieved from making
copayments, greater potential for fraud exists in connection with delivery of care to the poor or the alleged poor.
Additional fraud audits should be concentrated in services rendered to this population.
I. Recognize that a managed competition system
presents a potential difficulty for enforcing the exclusion
sanction. Neutralize this difficulty by giving law enforcement the tools needed to detect individual wrongdoers
within an organization; by restructuring standards for
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finding organizations criminally liable; and, by protecting consumers in the event their provider is excluded.
J. Recognize that the managed competition system
presents a potential for corruption. Ensure that law enforcement has the tools and training it needs to deter,
detect and prove this corruption. Clarify the difference
between illegal payments and legitimate contributions.
5. Rely on employers and financial institutions to collect
and remit health care premiums on earned and unearned income.
Require submission of an income tax return (or proof of payment
of one's health care premium contributed by one's employer) to
obtain a health care card. All cards should include sufficient identifying data to prevent theft and forgery of health care cards. Require presentation of a health care card before rendering services.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article is based upon two premises. First, fraud by
health care providers is influenced greatly by health care reimbursement mechanisms. This influence is pervasive, affecting the
amount of fraud committed, the types of fraud committed, and
the difficulty of detecting and proving fraud. Some reimbursement mechanisms encourage fraud, others discourage fraud. As
discussed in Part I, fee for service reimbursement has encouraged
large scale fraud, most of which is of four types and all of which is
difficult to detect and prove. Part II described an optimal reimbursement system, from an anti-fraud perspective. This suggested system contains four key features:
capitation
reimbursement; managed competition; uniform billing and reimbursement procedures; and, copayments. Part IV addressed the
collection-of-funds aspect of health care reform and suggested
the following: (1) collection of any health care premium should
be by employers, whether of amounts owed directly by employees
as a percentage of earned income or of amounts owed by employers as a percentage of payroll; collections also should be made by
financial institutions on unearned income; these techniques are
preferable to collecting the health care premium directly from individuals; and, (2) subsidies for health care to persons or businesses unable to pay their assigned share are fraught with
potential for fraud and should be monitored carefully. Requiring
submission of an income tax return before qualifying for any
health care services is one of the few systemic steps that can be
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taken to discourage some of the fraud that will surround the subsidy program.
The second premise on which this Article is based is that
while it is possible to devise a health care system that discourages
fraud, some fraud by providers always will exist. Our goal should
be the creation of a system that encourages as little fraud as possible while making the fraud that is committed easier to detect and
prove. Recognizing this, Part III analyzed the incentives for fraud
that will remain in the health care system recommended in Part II.
Part V detailed general and specific steps that can be taken to discourage, detect and prove fraud by health care providers,
whatever type of health care reform is implemented.
In health care, like in everything else, the way we pay people
affects the way they cheat. Efforts to combat health care fraud,
waste and abuse cannot remain confined to enhancing law enforcement techniques and tools. These efforts should be supported and strengthened, but however valiant they are, they are
no match for the pull of reimbursement mechanisms that invite,
entice, and lure too many providers to cheat. Rather, a complete
approach to fraud by providers must be systemic change. We
have the opportunity to make this change as the United States
moves toward health care reform. We should take advantage of
this opportunity by examining and analyzing the potential for
fraud in each of the reform options available.
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